Small business now has its own dedicated taxation division of the AAT

To give effect to a bi-partisan initiative, changes aimed at making it easier, cheaper and quicker for small businesses to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) against decisions by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) commenced on 1 March 2019. Small business taxpayers contemplating a tax appeal to the AAT with scant legal knowledge or representation will benefit most from the changes. Represented small business taxpayers too can benefit from the easier, cheaper and quicker AAT tax appeals and may improve their prospects of obtaining funding by the ATO of legal representation costs of their appeal.

Under the changes small business taxpayers can appeal adverse tax objection decisions to the new Small Business Taxation Division (SBTD) of the AAT. The Small Business Concierge Service (SBCS) within the office of the Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman (ASBFEO) also commenced on 1 March 2019 to assist small business taxpayers with appeals to the SBTD.

Tax and related review by the AAT

The AAT can review decisions on objections against tax assessments and other specified decisions made by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in the ATO domain on appeal under the Taxation Administration Act (C’th) 1953 viz decisions on:

  1. Commonwealth taxes: income tax, goods and services tax, excise, fringe benefits tax, luxury car tax, resource rent taxes (petroleum and minerals) and wine equalisation tax;
  2. Australian Business Numbers, fuel schemes, fuel tax credits, the ATO’s superannuation administration; and
  3. penalties and interest relating to a. and b.

The SBTD can review these decisions where the taxpayer/applicant is a small business entity under section 328-110 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (C’th) 1997.  A small business entity is an entity carrying on business with an aggregated turnover of less than $10 million in the current income year.

Cheaper – fees for AAT review

The ordinary filing fee for review of (appeal against) a reviewable decision by the ATO in the Taxation & Commercial Division of the AAT is $920 as at 1 March 2019. A single fee can apply if there are related multiple decisions in relation to the same appellant. A concessional fee of $91 applies for disadvantaged appellants: https://is.gd/1s5Vtt

The ordinary filing fee for review by the SBTD is a reduced $500. AAT regulations apply so that a SBTD taxpayer/applicant who the AAT finds is not a small business entity must pay an uplift to the ordinary $920 fee and their appeal will transfer to the Taxation & Commercial Division of the AAT.

Easier – Small Business Concierge Service

The SBCS of the ASBFEO assists a small business taxpayer with the SBTD appeal process and with advice about the appeal or prospective appeal to the SBTD the small business taxpayer plans. Although the SBCS is within the office of the ASBFEO and does not itself give legal advice, the SBCS:

  • offers a one hour consultation with an experienced small business tax lawyer to an unrepresented small business taxpayer prior to the appeal so the lawyer can review the facts pertaining to the ATO decision and provide advice on prospects of success of the appeal. In arranging a pre-appeal consultation the taxpayer needs to be aware of the 60 day time limit that generally applies for making appeals to the AAT on these decisions. A co-payment of $100 for the consultation is required from the small business taxpayer and the balance of the small business tax lawyer’s fee for the consultation is paid by ASBFEO;
  • assigns an ASBFEO case manager (not to be confused with the AAT case manager who will manage the appeals for the AAT) to help the small business to compile the relevant documents to maximise the benefit of the one hour pre-appeal legal consultation;
  • assists with the appeal to the SBTD if the small business chooses to go ahead with the appeal. The ASBFEO case manager assists with the applications and submissions to the SBTD and with engagement by the small business taxpayer with the AAT process; and
  • offers a second one hour consultation with an experienced small business tax lawyer to an unrepresented small business taxpayer after the appeal commences with the cost of the second consultation met by the ASBFEO without a co-payment.

Even if an unrepresented small business taxpayer utilises both hours of consultation with the assistance of the ASBFEO case manager it is still cheaper for the small business taxpayer to commence their appeal to the AAT for $600 in the SBTD, including the $100 co-payment, than to commence for $920 in the Taxation & Commercial Division.

Quicker – 28 day turnaround of reasons for decision

Decisions of the SBTD are to be “fast tracked” so that reasons for decisions will be given to the small business taxpayer usually within twenty-eight days of the hearing where the appeal goes that far. Where practicable an oral decision is to be given at the end of SBTD hearings.

Cheaper – further support for legal costs for SBTD appellants

Although the AAT, and the SBTD and the Taxation & Commercial Division in particular:

  • is not a court;
  • does not make cost orders;
  • isn’t bound by the legal rules of evidence; and
  • of itself, imposes no imperative to have legal representation;

the reality is that, where significant tax is in dispute in an appeal to the AAT, most informed appellants are legally represented and present their case in conformity with rules of evidence as if the AAT was a court. The ATO, too, selectively attends the AAT with external legal representation and, if not, ATO officers who conduct cases and appear at the AAT for the ATO are likely to have legal skills and experience. AAT decisions are reported/published and are used as legal precedent. Appellants can, though, more readily request and obtain anonymity from the AAT in tax cases than they can in courts which operate on the principle that justice is to be done in public.

The SBTD initiative partly synchronises the legal representation choice of a small business taxpayer and the ATO in a SBTD case. The ATO has transparent policy positions on when the ATO will use external legal representation in the AAT. The ATO’s position generally is that the ATO will use external legal representation where the case has high legal or factual complexity or where the case has implications for other taxpayers. Where the ATO is to engage legal representation in the SBTD then the ATO:

  • must inform the appellant that it proposes to engage external legal representation; and;
  • may meet the legal costs of the legal representation of the small business appellant that do not exceed the ATO’s legal costs of its own external legal representation. That is a possibly contentious integer as the ATO has and uses its leverage, which a small business doesn’t have, to negotiate lower fees from legal counsel with expectation of more ATO briefs.

Cheaper – greater opportunity for ATO litigation funding

This opportunity for a small business taxpayer to obtain the assistance of the ATO with their costs of legal representation in the SBTD dovetails with the test case funding policy of the ATO. Like under that policy the decision to assist a small business taxpayer with its legal costs of a SBTD appeal is with the ATO. Where the case has implications for other taxpayers then it is more likely that the ATO will both seek its own external representation and will fund the small business taxpayer’s legal costs up to the same level. Although time will tell, a small business taxpayer appears to be in an enhanced position to obtain ATO assistance with their legal representation costs in the SBTD as compared to taxpayers generally who appeal to the Taxation & Commercial Division of the AAT or who appeal directly to the Federal Court which involves significantly greater costs.

Unlike the Federal Court, the AAT does not order costs. That means that the legal fees and costs of a small business taxpayer running an appeal in the SBTD will only come from the ATO SBDT case funding or ATO test case funding, if not self funded, as legal costs won’t be awarded by the AAT even where the small business taxpayer is successful in a tax appeal case.

ASBFEO already acts as a gateway and assists small businesses to access funding for small business disputes. It is understood that the SBCS will be similarly resourced to act as a gateway to assist small businesses to obtain legal representation funding under both SBTD or ATO test case funding guidelines.

$3,000 deduction cap for managing personal tax affairs – non-millionaires caught in the cross-fire?

Labor’s Fairer Tax System plan

The ALP’s Andrew Leigh and Chris Bowen announced their A Fairer Tax System for Millions, Not Millionaires plan on 13 May 2017. The plan is comprised of a number of laudable and progressive policy announcements including transparency improvements that will impede tax avoidance by wealthy taxpayers and multinationals.

These policies are:

  1. $3,000 cap on deductions for managing their tax affairs for individuals.
  2. Public reporting of country-by-country reports.
  3. Whistleblower protection and rewards.
  4. Mandatory shareholder reporting of tax haven exposure.
  5. Public reporting of Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) data.
  6. Government tenderers must disclose their country of tax domicile.
  7. Develop guidelines for tax haven investment by superannuation funds.
  8. Publicly accessible registry of the beneficial ownership of Australian listed companies.
  9. Australian Taxation Office disclosure of settlements and reporting of aggressive tax minimisation.

The first measure, which this blog post concerns, is a proposed cap of $3,000 on the income tax deduction for managing personal tax affairs. There is no doubt this cap will restrict tax deductibility, which is substantially the funding by other taxpayers, of wealthy taxpayers’ tax professional costs of devising ways to avoid paying Australian tax.

Why an arbitrary $3,000 cap?

Still the $3,000 cap is arbitrary and there is, somehow, a disconnect in the announcement between the proposed cap and the millionaires against whom it is targeted. Why is the cap $3,000 rather than $30,000? My point is that it is not so unusual for ordinary taxpayers, particularly property owners who are not millionaires at whom the Fairer Tax System proposals are directed, to rack up tax professional costs of more than $3,000 for managing their tax affairs in an income year. The $3,000 cap includes tax agent costs for annual tax return preparation and lodgment so the remaining cap to deal with remaining tax difficulties or obligations will be something less than $3,000. So, although the measure will achieve its aim to curb deductibility of these costs to millionaires, there will be taxpayers who are not millionaires who will be collaterally caught with non-deductible tax professional costs in excess of the cap.

It is not so clear that the cap has been designed by someone who has real experience of seriously high individual tax professional costs and of situations where they may happen. Sure, all being well, a salary earner who owns real estate and who engages a tax agent, who charges moderately, will have tax professional costs in an income year comfortably under the cap. However, the salary earner with tax difficulties out of the ordinary may find himself or herself with a need to take a considered custom professional tax advice or to have his or her tax advisor non-prejudicially apply for a binding private ruling to protect himself or herself under the self assessment system.

The self assessment system

Out of the ordinary doesn’t mean tax avoidance is going on. Under the self assessment system a taxpayer is responsible for correct reporting and filing of tax information and severe penalties and interest apply if the taxpayer makes an error and a tax shortfall is assessed. If the taxpayer has an activity or activities where the tax treatment is unclear then it is the taxpayer who must ensure his or her return or other statements to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) complies with tax law adopting, in the least, a reasonably arguable position on items in the return or statements that are contentious.

Something over $2,000 is not a big budget for obtaining a tax advice letter or a position paper or for professional preparation of an application for a private binding ruling or a complex objection. Often issues an individual can face can take a tax professional a couple of days or more to do thoroughly.

It can be costly just to understand obligations imposed by government

Not so long ago I was briefed to give tax advice to an owner of a heritage building about to enter into a sale of “transferable floor space” in compliance with local government heritage laws. The interaction of the relevant capital gains tax (CGT) and goods and service tax (GST) laws with property, environment and local government laws, cases and public rulings took considerable time to work through even in the absence of any live dispute about these matters with the ATO. $2,000 would have been a fraction of fees for the time needed to give advice so that the client understood the client’s CGT and GST obligations on the sale . The correct application of CGT events and tax rules that apply in this client’s situation are notably unclear and difficult and, in its rulings, the ATO takes positions which some may view as confused and ambiguous. A withering array of laws applied to this heritage building owner.

Each of these laws, considered separately, benefit or aim to benefit government, society and thus other taxpayers by the contribution of taxes, the stimulation of commerce and the preservation of heritage buildings. But is it fair for society to impose such a multitude of obligations on a not necessarily wealthy building owner yet severely reduce society’s contribution to the owner’s costs of compliance with them?

You see much of my work, and the work of many other tax advisors who act for clients who are not necessarily wealthy, is just to advise or explain how the tax law applies to them and what their position is. Generally, as the tax laws have been tweaked and greatly expanded over time, the tax laws do not present exploitative opportunities to ordinary taxpayers for avoidance. There are, of course, exceptions.

The CGT provisions are a good example of tax laws that are necessarily intricate and complex. $2,000 in professional advice costs just to understand a CGT position in an advice from a CGT expert won’t go far. The CGT rules can apply, and severely, to taxpayers who own property, securities and other valuables. If the owner dies or is a non-resident the complexity can ratchet up. Not all of the aforementioned are millionaires.

It can be costly to get a ruling or guidance from the Australian Taxation Office

It is frequently the case that an ordinary taxpayer is unable to articulate, or would be disadvantaged having to personally articulate, a technical capital gains tax problem to the ATO without professional assistance in order to obtain guidance or a binding private ruling from the ATO. So an ordinary taxpayer can be justified in seeking substantial tax professional help applying for a private binding ruling from the ATO. If a binding private ruling adverse to the taxpayer is issued by the ATO the taxpayer may seek to dispute the ruling and still further tax professional help is needed. The taxpayer’s professional tax advisor may need to attend the ATO or prepare an objection or appeal.

The intractability of many tax problems, notably capital gains tax problems, is usually not the fault of the taxpayer but is a feature of complex tax law seeking to impose tax obligations in a wide diversity of situations fairly on the tax paying community.

Costly tax problems not of concern to wealthy taxpayers

A taxpayer of modest means suffers an injury at work and receives an ongoing insurance payout. This taxpayer is the opposite of a millionaire. Still the taxation of the insurance payout gives rise to the income versus capital conundrum on which the Australian income tax system continues to rely. The payouts fall through the cracks of types of insurance payout that are afforded tax exempt status under the Income Assessment Acts 1936 and 1997. If the payouts are capital then capital gains on personal injury payouts are exempt from CGT so there is a lot of tax at stake if the payouts should be treated as capital rather than as assessable income.

Pursuing capital treatment of the payouts is not tax avoidance by the wealthy. Inevitably ruling, objection and appeal costs of disputing that the payouts are not assessable income are likely to be way in excess of $3,000.

These kinds of cases appear often enough in published Administrative Appeals Tribunal reports, and there are plenty below the visible tip of that iceberg to show that they still remain a frequent and expensive kind of tax dispute for injury victims. To deprive injury victims of tax deductibility for costs of their tax dispute to target other less deserving taxpayers is tough indeed on taxpayers affected. It is of no consolation to an ordinary taxpayer who can’t claim most of their seriously high tax professional costs that he or she is one of a number of less than 90,000 taxpayers who incur more than $3,000 in tax professional costs each income year.

Australia’s tax system abounds in these kinds of structural challenges. Whether or not an activity of a taxpayer amounts to “an adventure in the nature of trade” and consequently an enterprise carried on by a taxpayer attracting a GST obligation, is another good example of a tax uncertainty a taxpayer who is not a millionaire may find costly to solve in their case and may not solve without taking valuable professional assistance.

The cap binary and alternatives to better target the cap

So if $3,000 might not be enough of a cap to ensure fair operation of the cap, why impose a binary limitation with such a confidence in the announcement that its impact will be on millionaires?

The small business capital gains tax measures themselves show that the demarcation between “small” and bigger business is not necessarily easily achieved as shown by the unwieldy $6 million net asset test. A demarcation between ordinary and “millionaire” taxpayers to qualify for exemption under the cap may be similarly difficult. But might it be possible to devise a targeted cap which looks at the character of the professional tax costs of a taxpayer of managing their personal tax affairs so that the cap operates more equitably?

For instance could costs of professional tax work just directed at establishing the position of a taxpayer under certain tax laws on non-contrived circumstances be exempted from the cap? Most capital gains tax rules could be within that exemption. If the professional work addressed specific anti-avoidance measures, the general anti-avoidance provisions or exploitative tax planning the professional work could be “tainted” by that consideration and so fall outside of the exemption. One difficulty is that some sort of “chinese wall” solution may be needed so privileged thus confidential tax advice could be considered to verify whether the costs of the professional tax law assistance is exempt from a targeted cap on costs of managing tax affairs.

It may be possible to conveniently go through all of the (many) tax laws and classify those where issues and disputes arising from them are benign, in an avoidance context, as exempt from the cap. Often wealthy taxpayers and their advisers have little interaction with these laws and so exempting them would not give wealthy taxpayers any advantage. That would better achieve the aim of the Fairer Tax System plan.

Getting tax advice to take the 50% recklessness penalty out of play

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Self-assessment

Under Australia’s self-assessment system taxes including, notably, income tax and the goods and services tax, are based on returns by each taxpayer where responsibility is on the taxpayer to ensure statements and representations made to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) reflected in those returns are true and correct.

Penalties when returns are not true and correct

When a taxpayer departs from true and correct disclosure to the ATO, penalties, including base penalties, for false and misleading statements to the ATO, unarguable tax positions and tax schemes are imposed by Division 284 of Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act (C’th) 1953.

To understand the base penalty regime in Division 284 it is helpful to consider simplified categories of a taxpayer’s disclosures relevant to their return viz:

  1. those items that are straight forward where the taxpayer understands how the item should be returned and its impact on the taxpayer’s tax liability, and
  2. those items which are more complex or difficult where the taxpayer does not fully understand how the item should be returned and its impact on the taxpayer’s tax liability.

It is expected, or at least hoped, that matters in the first category will greatly outnumber matters in the second category. Still an item in the second category may involve a large liability and there may be a need for the taxpayer to resolve the complexity or difficulty, by taking tax advice or perhaps by obtaining a binding private ruling from the Commissioner of Taxation about that item to ensure the item is correctly returned.

As a general proposition it can be said that, unless other mitigating factors apply, failure to correctly return an item in the first category attracts the 75% “intentional disregard” base penalty and that failure to correctly return an item in the second category attracts the 50% “recklessness” base penalty based on the reasoning below:  

Deceptively understating assessable income or overstating allowable deductions etc.

If a taxpayer omits an item in the first category from an income tax return which understates true and correct taxable income then the highest base penalty of 75% for intentional disregard of a taxation law under the table in section 284-90 can be imposed. This isn’t the only liability that follows from a tax review, audit or investigation of a tax return. In addition to section 284-90 base penalties, the taxpayer will be held separately liable for the tax on the taxable income that should have been returned, medicare levy, and, to reflect the time value of taxes outstanding to the ATO, the shortfall interest charge and the general interest charge, etc when an amended assessment is raised to amend the original assessment which was not true and correct.

Base penalties, including the 75% intentional disregard base penalty, are imposed on a case by case basis. Thus the ATO will infer from the way the return was completed and surrounding facts whether there was intentional disregard of taxation law justifying imposition of a 75% intentional disregard base penalty. Similar considerations as arise as to whether there was fraud or evasion (which impacts on when an amended assessment can be raised) including whether the conduct giving rise to the omission of assessable income or the overstatement of allowable deductions or offsets etc. was deceptive or calculated, or whether the conduct could be explained as some sort of mistake, which attracts a lesser penalty, are relevant.

50% “recklessness” base penalty applied in PSI cases

The recent personal services income (PSI) cases of Douglass v. Commissioner of Taxation [2018] AATA 3729 (3 October 2018) and Fortunatow v. Commissioner of Taxation [2018] AATA 4621 (14 December 2018) illustrate how the 50% “recklessness” base penalty under the table in section 284-90, one rung down from the highest 75% intentional disregard base penalty, can be applied to a taxpayer who fails to correctly apply taxation law to matters in the second category.

Both cases involved the application of the personal services income measures in Part 2-42 of Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1997 to the income of professionals (an engineer and a business analyst respectively) which was alienated from the respective individual professionals by arrangements using related companies reducing their overall income tax liabilities.

Complex or difficult?

The personal services income measures in Part 2-42 are relatively complex involving multi-tiered considerations of various tests even though the Commissioner of Taxation expressed this view in the objection decision in Douglass (from para 110 of the AAT decision):

The attribution rule of the PSI is not an overly complex area of the relevant law. There was readily available information on the operation of the PSI rules set out on the ATO website. It was also explained in the Partnership tax return instruction and in the Personal Services income schedule instruction that accompanied the tax return guide for company, partnerships and trusts. You did not make further enquiries to check the correct tax treatment of your PSI.

In both cases, the taxpayers primarily relied on the “results test” in section 87-18 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 to establish that, in each case, a personal service business was being carried on so that alienated income for the personal services of the individuals would not be attributed to the individuals under Part 2-42. On the facts of each case, each AAT found that the individual was not engaged to produce a result in accord with section 87-18 and so could not satisfy the “results test”.

Recklessness

Also, in both cases, the AAT was critical of the way in which each taxpayer tried to ascertain their respective liabilities under the personal services income measures. In Douglass the taxpayer did not take a cogent advice on how the PSI measures can apply. In Fortunatow the taxpayer had received an advice on asset protection considerations from a tax lawyer which inferred that PSI advice should be taken. But that PSI tax advice was not taken by the taxpayer in Fortunatow.

In each case the AAT referred to BRK (Bris) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) ATC 4111 where Cooper J. at p.4129 considered “recklessness”:

Recklessness in this context means to include in a tax statement material upon which the Act or regulations are to operate, knowing that there is a real, as opposed to a fanciful risk, that the material may be incorrect, or be grossly indifferent as to whether or not the material is true and correct, and that a reasonable person in the position of the statement-maker would see there was a real risk that the Act and regulations may not operate correctly to lead to the assessment of the proper tax payable because of the content of the tax statement. So understood, the proscribed conduct is more than mere negligence and must amount to gross carelessness.

It was unhelpful to the case of the taxpayer in Fortunatow that the taxpayer had been made aware by his tax advice that the PSI measures had potential application to him and that there was a real risk that he was not correctly complying with tax laws. The tax advice he received went no further than saying that income would not be attributed under the PSI measures if there was a personal services business but the taxpayer could not show that he had been advised that he had been carrying on a personal services business.

Obligation on the taxpayer to be correct

These AAT decisions leave little doubt that the responsibility on a taxpayer to correctly address and resolve complex or difficult tax questions in completing their tax returns is serious and far reaching. Ordinarily this means that a taxpayer will need a cogent tax advice or will need to take other steps to demonstrate that the taxpayer has adequately addressed each question to mitigate the “real risk” that the taxpayer’s position on a complex question in a tax return is incorrect to avoid “recklessness”.

Interaction with other base penalties and where taking cogent tax advice is desirable

This removes the opportunity to shirk a complex question or issue in a tax return and to rely on the difficulty or character of the question or issue to assert that some lesser base penalty, such as the 25% base penalties under Division 284 either for failure:

  1. to take reasonable care; or
  2. to take a reasonably arguable position;

is applicable.

Base penalties under Division 284 of Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act (C’th) 1953 apply on the basis that the highest base penalty applies to the exclusion of the other applicable base penalties.

Complex PSI cases demonstrate how self-assessment works

The above personal service income cases provide good case studies of how base penalties under Division 284 are likely to apply in cases where a category 2 complex issue arises and a taxpayer fails to adequately address the issue in their return to the ATO.

Although the ATO cannot apply a 75% intentional disregard base penalty where the taxpayer was without intent to disregard taxation law which was or may have been too complex for the taxpayer to appreciate; the 50% recklessness base penalty, on the next rung down, can nevertheless be applied because of the taxpayer’s failure to deal with that complexity. Complexity is dealt with by taking cogent tax advice from a professional tax adviser for example. It can be seen that the 50% recklessness base penalty is thus integral to taxpayers taking responsibility for true and correct disclosure to the ATO under the self-assessment system.

Rights to object to a tax assessment lost when waived under a deed to settle a tax dispute

separateIn EE&C Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Tarcisio Cremasco Family Trust v. Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2018] AATA 4093 (30 October 2018) the taxpayer, after concluding a minute of terms of agreement with the Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner) on 18 January 2011, entered into a deed to settle a tax dispute with the Commissioner for the 1999 to 2005 years of income on 23 March 2011 (the Deed of Settlement).

Assessments in line with settlement

On 2 June 2011 the Commissioner issued a series of assessments for those years primarily increasing, and in some income years reducing, the taxable income of the taxpayer in line with the Deed of Settlement.

Under the contractual terms of the Deed of Settlement the taxpayer was precluded from objecting against the assessments which issued as negotiated and set out in the terms.

Despite that the taxpayer had its lawyers prepare and lodge “objections” against the 2 June 2011 assessments on 4 June 2014.

Right conferred by statute overrides the terms to settle?

Apparently the lawyer had explained to the taxpayer that the taxpayer’s right to object against a taxation assessment, or more precisely a “taxation decision” under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act (C’th) 1953 (the TAA), is a statutory right which had lead the taxpayer to understand that their right to object persisted despite the apparent waiver of their right to object against the assessments in the Deed of Settlement.

Commissioner relied on the taxpayer’s waiver in the Deed of Settlement

The Commissioner took a contrary view and refused to treat the 4 June 2014 “objections” as valid objections.

Waiver did impact the statutory right to object

The AAT found that the Commissioner was correct in his approach. Deputy President Forgie of the AAT concluded that, as the 4 June 2014 “objections” were invalid, the AAT had no jurisdiction to review how the Commissioner dealt with them under the TAA and the Administration Appeals Tribunal Act (C’th) 1975.

Capability to waive right to object/appeal an imperative in settling tax disputes

At paragraph 89 of the AAT decision, Deputy President Forgie described a functional imperative that a taxpayer can waive their statutory right to object or appeal to settle Part IVC review and appeal proceedings:

The authorities of Cox, Grofam, Fowles and Precision Pools all support the Commissioner’s reaching a settlement with the taxpayer.  The taxpayer must be permitted to forego his rights of objection and review or appeal just as the Commissioner may fulfil his obligation to decide the objection and respond to the review or appeal in terms that do so but are reached by way of agreement with the taxpayer rather than by, for example, imposition of a decision of the Tribunal or judgment of the Court.  Agreement may be reached before a taxpayer engages in the formal processes of taxation objection leading to an objection decision and on to review or appeal or at some point during the process.

Why a Part IVC right to object or appeal is a type of right that can be waived

The AAT drew a distinction between a statutory right that can be waived under a contract and a statutory right that cannot. At paragraph 90, Deputy President Forgie referred to the general rule, expressed by Higgins J. in Davies v. Davies [1919] HCA 17; (1919) 26 CLR 348, at p 362:

Anyone is at liberty to renounce a right conferred by law for his own sole benefit; but he cannot renounce a right conferred for the benefit of society.

and gave examples of other statutory rights where the recipient of the right may abandon the right or not pursue the right. It follows that as a taxpayer is the sole recipient of the legal right to object under Part IVC, the taxpayer is able to renounce that right in the course of settlement of a Part IVC dispute.

Should more than one family share a family discretionary trust?

pointatdeedFrom time to time a family discretionary trust is set up for the benefit of two or more families who may be pursuing a business or a venture in common.

Risk of unequal returns from the discretionary trust!

A double (or more) -throated family discretionary trust is unwise on a number of levels and often reflects misunderstanding of the tax and civil dispute realities that can apply to trusts.

If there is a dispute between the business/venture principals then backing out of this kind of structure it can lead to complications where there are assets in the discretionary trust still to be divided and distributed to beneficiaries. One of the principals controlling the trustee may die or become incapacitated and the other principal may take the opportunity to distribute the assets of the trust solely to his or family! The other family may claim, say, that they should get 50% of the assets of the trust, or the value of the work contributed by them to the trust, but the trust document, being based solely on discretion, will disavow that any family has a 50% or other set interest in the trust.

A family discretionary trust is often funded by gift from the beneficiary family or by the unrewarded work of a member of the beneficiary family. That may be but there is no obligation on the trustee to return the capital or the income of the discretionary trust in proportion to those contributions to that family. The families are highly reliant on the arrangements for control of the trustee, who holds the discretion to distribute the income and capital of the trust, to ensure members of each family will participate in the income and capital of the trust on any equal basis.

A hybrid trust is an alternative to a multi family family discretionary trust which addresses such problems but hybrid trusts have their own separate set of commercial and tax difficulties.

Reimbursement agreements

Multi-family family discretionary trusts can be at high risk of audit under the “reimbursement agreement” provisions in s100A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. Income distributions by the trust could be used to shift value between the families tax effectively however, if section 100A is applied, the distributions are void for tax purposes. The principals and their families, as beneficiaries, can’t resist a section 100A assessment with the usual defence based on the definition of “agreement’ in sub-section 100A(13) viz. that the distribution reflects an ordinary dealing within the family, because it does not. They are dealing between families.

Sometimes these structures are used to save establishment costs notably stamp duty which in NSW is as much as $500 to establish a trust where the trust holds no dutiable property. Such savings may prove inadvisable due to later considerable cost.

Be wary of constitutional fails by your private company

sqpegroundholeAdministering a private company requires sound business skill and judgment. Since the Commonwealth has substantially taken legislative responsibility for companies and securities from the states, regulatory reform has been introduced so that numerous compliance obligations have been streamlined in a practical way.

It is not always understood that the reforms were only to the regulatory framework of companies. They do not necessarily extend to the differing regimes in place for each company. Conduct of a private company still very much remains the responsibility of the directors of the company who are required to observe the constitution of the company (COTC). A number of the regulatory reforms have no affect on the regime that applies to a company unless the company takes the necessary action to enliven them.

From 1998 – the “replaceable rules”

Reform to the framework in the Company Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA 1998) introduced “replaceable rules” that apply to a proprietary (private) company other than a company with a sole director/shareholder. Unlike “Table A” in the former states’ Companies Acts, which could be adopted as articles of association optionally by a private company, the “replaceable rules” take effect by default. In other words a company, which does not adopt a custom divergent COTC, is taken to adopt and can rely on the “replaceable rules” in the Corporations Act 2001. Nevertheless a majority of private companies, including companies established prior to 1998, have adopted a COTC which overrides the replaceable rules and their impact. So the reforms reflected in the “replaceable rules” don’t apply to those companies.

This post highlights some of the difficulties this causes to private companies that we notice in practice.

Directors meetings

When private companies take significant actions resolutions need to be passed by the directors. As a standard, resolutions of directors need to be passed or agreed to at a directors meeting. It is a common alternative practice for directors of a company to complete a “circulated” resolution of directors signed by all directors of the company without formally holding a directors meeting. For most private companies that is fine as their COTC permits this procedure as an alternative to the company holding a directors meeting. The alternative procedure is authorised both in:

  • model “Table A” type COTCs which pre-date the reforms; and
  • section 248A of the Corporations Act 2001 where section 248A applies to the company as a replaceable rule.

However there is a minority of companies with old or inadequately drafted COTCs where the “circulated” resolution of directors capability is not available to the company either under the COTC, or under the replaceable rule in section 248A where the provisions in the COTC replace the replaceable rules including section 248A.

Invalid directors’ resolutions

Thus directors of private companies may be completing “circulated” directors’ resolutions on the mistaken assumption that their COTC, or the replaceable rule in section 248A, authorises the resolution without the holding of a directors meeting. The impugning of all of the resolutions of the directors of a company done in this way could have far reaching consequences for the company particularly if the activity of the company comes under the close scrutiny of government or lawyers. For instance, say a company in this predicament is a trustee of family discretionary trust: It is open for the Commissioner of Taxation to treat a resolution to distribute income to beneficiaries done in a way unauthorised by the COTC as invalid and not made in time to prevent the income being assessed for income tax to the trustee of the trust at the highest marginal rate under s99A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.

If a COTC displaces the replaceable rules it is prudent to identify the capability in the COTC that permits the directors to use a circulated resolution instead of holding a directors meeting and to cite the reference to the capability in the circulated resolution. Look for wording in your COTC similar to section 248A. It is often the last article under the DIRECTORS PROCEEDINGS part of a COTC.

A COTC without the circulated resolution capability frequently has other shortcomings such as no capability for a director to attend a directors’ meeting by telephone or online over the internet. This is another case where inadequacy of the COTC can lead to invalidity of attempted directors resolutions done with this capability assumed by the directors.

Directors resolutions can also fail due to other procedural misunderstandings such as:

  • failure to give notice of a directors’ meeting to all directors;
  • a meeting may have a quorum requirement under a COTC which is not met; and
  • a proceeding by a single director is not a meeting.

Single director companies

The CLRA 1998 also changed the regulatory framework to allow for single director companies. Prior to the CLRA 1998 the minimum number of individual shareholders of a private company was two and so many memorandums and articles of association of private companies then in place, which became their COTCs from 1998, entrenched the two individual director minimum to comply with the pre-CLRA 1998 law. These COTCs required alteration to remove the minimum of two individual director stipulations and to allow the company to have a single director. This is a more obvious case of where a pre-CLRA 1998 COTC, in particular, needs alteration should the private company seek to have only one director.

Common seals

The obligation of a company to use a common seal to execute documents was also removed from the regulatory framework by the CLRA 1998. Still a private company which was established before 1998, or any private company that has otherwise adopted a common seal, may need to act to dispense with its obligation to use the common seal.

Ordinarily this action would be:

  • The COTC is altered to:
    • provide that the company need not have a common seal; and
    • support the execution of documents by the company without a common seal.
  • The directors resolve to dispense with the common seal.

Execution of deeds and other documents, including, for example, an election by a company as trustee to become a regulated superannuation fund, can be invalidated if the private company must use a common seal that remains adopted by the company but executes the deed or documents without that common seal.

Special purpose superannuation companies – reduced ASIC annual fee

The reforms allowed for a company that has been set up to act solely as the trustee of a regulated superannuation fund, or for other designated special purposes, to apply a substantially reduced ASIC annual fee of $40 rather than $226.50. Entitlement to the reduced fee for a company that has been set up to act solely as the trustee of a regulated superannuation fund turns on the limit on the purposes for which the company can act being effectively included in the COTC.

It’s a fail for the directors to complete the declaration to claim the reduced fee without understanding whether the provisions of the COTC support the entitlement to a reduced fee.

Summary

Directors of a private company are expected to understand and to take responsibility for what is in the COTC.

Although the company regulatory framework has been reformed:

  • to more readily allow circulated directors’ resolutions as an alternative to holding directors’ meetings;
  • to allow private companies to have a single director;
  • to make common seals optional; and
  • to extend a reduced ASIC annual fee to dedicated superannuation trustee companies;

among other reforms, the COTC of the company and the standing resolutions of the directors are a regime which constrains how the reforms may apply to a private company. Directors of companies should check COTCs and their records to ensure that they support the company using capabilities supported by the reforms.

The discretionary capital distribution – it’s a CGT free gift!

giftAnnual income distributions by family discretionary trusts (FDTs) are routine for trustees for apparent Australian income tax reasons but trustees of FDTs can be reluctant to distribute trust capital. What would be the reason for that reluctance? Why don’t trustees of FDTs make capital distributions more often?

The trust deed

The regime in a FDT deed typically centres on distribution of capital on the vesting of the FDT. However even older and archaic FDT deeds usually expressly allow for interim distribution of capital, that is, distribution of trust capital before the FDT vests and winds up. Interim distribution of capital to beneficiaries, rather than holding it for them until the vesting day, is often conditional on the distribution being for the “maintenance education advancement in life or benefit” either for infant  beneficiaries or for beneficiaries generally – see Fischer v Nemeske Pty. Ltd. [2016] HCA 11: a condition which, in ordinary family dealings, can readily be met.

Purpose of a FDT

A FDT is, in its essence, an arrangement to benefit family members. A FDT can be seen as a pool set aside to gift to family members. But is a distribution to a family beneficiary from a FDT treated the same for tax as a family gift to a family member?

It is useful to think about differences between a FDT and other types of entities before answering that:

Difference to a proprietary company

A proprietary company has the legal status of a separate person and the release of company capital to a shareholder of a company is subject to a number of corporations law and tax technicalities. A company can have wide objects but giving its value away to other persons would not usually be one of them. Under tax rules the enrichment of a shareholder’s family member from a company’s capital is likely dividend income assessable to income tax either directly or as a “payment” under section 109C of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.

Difference to a unit trust

A trustee of a genuine unit trust would generally be required to make capital distributions in equal proportions based on the unit holdings of unit holders. If capital distributions from a unit trust are feasible the capital gains tax (CGT) rules can discourage the trustee from making these distributions before vesting.  CGT event E4 applies to distributions of capital of a unit trust which are not in connection with the disposal of the units to reduce the cost base of the unit holder by the amount of the distribution and, to the extent the cost base doesn’t cover the amount of the distribution, the excess is a capital gain assessable to unit holders.

How CGT applies to distributions of capital by FDTs

CGT event E4 does not apply to non-assessable capital distributions from a FDT. In Taxation Determination TD 2003/28 Income tax: capital gains: does CGT event E4 in section 104-70 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 happen if the trustee of a discretionary trust makes a non-assessable payment to: (a) a mere object; or (b) a default beneficiary? the Commissioner of Taxation confirms his longstanding view and practice, since the introduction of CGT in 1986, that CGT event E4 does not happen if a trustee of a discretionary trust makes a non-assessable payment to a mere object. That is, a mere discretionary beneficiary where the entitlement to the payment arose because the trustee exercised its discretion in the beneficiary’s favour and the interest was not acquired by the beneficiary for consideration or by way of assignment.

The CGT similarity of FDT cash distributions and cash gifts

The enrichment of a family beneficiary of a FDT by an interim distribution of the capital of a FDT is not, of itself, subject to CGT based on TD 2003/28 i.e. there is no CGT on a distribution of cash to a beneficiary from the capital of a FDT. If there is a distribution of a CGT asset from the capital of a FDT to a beneficiary that is a different story. CGT events E5 and E7 can apply to subject the realisation of the CGT asset by the FDT to a family beneficiary to CGT (see sub-sections 104-75(3) and 104-85(3) respectively of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 which visits the CGT event on the the trustee of the trust – sub-sections 104-75(6) and 104-85(6) generally enable the beneficiary of a FDT to disregard a capital gain or capital loss under either of these CGT events where the beneficiary acquired the asset within the trust without incurring expenditure viz. on a capital distribution by the trustee the beneficiary is treated only as the acquirer of the asset for CGT purposes).

But there is no fundamental difference between a distribution of a CGT asset from the capital of a FDT, and the CGT events that apply to it, and how a family gift of a CGT asset by an individual is treated for CGT. That is, a gift of cash is CGT free and a gift in the form of property that is a CGT asset is subjected to CGT: not because of the gift but because a CGT asset is being realised and the CGT regime brings gains in value on a CGT asset to tax on a change of ownership.

So cash distributions of capital by a FDT, where permissible under a trust deed of a FDT, can generally occur, either with income year end income distributions or at other times during the currency of a FDT, without income tax consequences.

However there is a problematic exception:

Small business CGT concessions participation percentage

Under item 2 in the table in section 152-70 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 the “small business participation percentage” of a beneficiary of a FDT is the smaller of the percentages of the beneficiary’s entitlement to income and the beneficiary’s entitlement to capital in an income year if both income distributions and capital distributions are made in that year. Generally beneficiaries are better off qualifying for a sufficient small business participation percentage to qualify for the concessions if no distribution of capital, or no divergent distribution of capital (bearing in mind that a capital gain on an active asset distributed by a FDT is likely to have a capital component), has been made in the income year the relevant capital gain has been made in to some other beneficiary.

So if a capital gain arises to a FDT in an income year which can attract the small business CGT concessions in Division 152 of that Act, then a distribution of the income in that income year substantially to family member A, including entitlement to a capital gain, may not count or count sufficiently in the measurement of small business participation percentage where a cash distribution of capital has been made to family member B and not family member A who is left with a “smaller” participation percentage. It could be that family member A may thus not qualify as a significant individual or as a CGT concession stakeholder without the sufficient interest in capital distributions of the FDT in the relevant income year in which the capital gain was made.

So a trustee of FDT needs to be wary of cash distributions of capital from a FDT and, indeed, the streaming of capital gains where there has been a capital gain that can attract the small business CGT concessions to ensure that the desired beneficiaries have sufficient entitlements to capital that can attract the concessions. If the small business CGT concessions participation percentage is not in issue a cash distribution from from the capital of a FDT to a beneficiary can be a tax benign.

How perpetuities law limits can impact trust distributions to other trusts

WaitandSeeVesting of trust property

Perpetuities laws apply in Australian states to limit the period by the end of which interests in property of a trust must vest in a beneficiary. As I mentioned in my March 2018 post on bringing trusts to a timely end, “vest” broadly means to imbue with ownership of property. So, when property of the trust vests, the beneficiaries of the trust succeed the trustee of the trust as entitled to the property in the trust.

Discretionary trusts are subject to an eighty year maximum perpetuity period

The maximum perpetuity period (MaxPP) under each perpetuity law is the maximum period by the end of which property held on trust must vest. As I observe in my March 2018 post, property of a trust can already be vested in beneficiaries but, in the case of property of an ongoing discretionary trust, where there is a discretion to distribute income or capital to discretionary beneficiaries; the property held on the trust has not vested.

The MaxPP is consistently eighty years from when the trust commences under state perpetuities laws excepting South Australia where the perpetuity law has been repealed.

Where a disposition of property held by a discretionary trust does not vest within the MaxPP then the disposition of property to the trust is void under the perpetuities laws. That is the trust fails over that disposition and the property that was supposedly to be held on the trust is vested in and held for return to the settlor and the others who have given it to the supposed trustee.

“Wait and see” rule

The states that have a perpetuity law also adopt a “wait and see” rule to soften the harsh outcome of causing a trust over property, which might fail to vest the property within the MaxPP, to be void. Under the “wait and see” rule persons interested can wait until the expiry of the perpetuity period to see whether a disposition of property on trust has vested. If the property has not vested in a beneficiary by then, then the affected disposition of property to the trust is void.

The perpetuities complication of trusts as discretionary beneficiaries of a trust

Many family discretionary trust arrangements allow distribution of income or capital of the trust to other trusts.

Example

Let us say Trust A and Trust B:

  • are family discretionary trusts that commenced in 2010 and 2015 respectively;
  • to which the law of Queensland applies;
  • with each specifying a perpetuity period for the vesting of their property of eighty years from their commencement.

Trust B is a beneficiary of Trust A and in 2018, the trustee of Trust A exercises its discretion and distributes some of the 2018 income of Trust A to Trust B.

Under the perpetuities law the MaxPP is eighty years. The income of Trust A, which was the property of Trust A, must vest in accordance with that law and under its perpetuity period term by 2090. But, following the distribution to Trust B the prospects are that the trustee of Trust B:

  • may not vest the income received from Trust A by 2090 even though 2090 is the expiry of the MaxPP applicable to property (that wasn’t vested in a beneficiary) that was held in Trust A; and
  • is not obliged to vest the property of Trust B under the perpetuity period applicable to Trust B before 2095.

If the trustee of Trust B hasn’t vested the income received from Trust A by 2090, the disposition of that income from Trust A to Trust B is void as the property of Trust A hasn’t vested by the expiry of the MaxPP for Trust A when the “wait and see” rule no longer has effect. But does that prospect invalidate that disposition at an earlier point in time because Trust B, which has received the property which must vest by 2090, is not slated to definitely vest until 2095?

Nemesis Australia Pty Ltd

This situation was considered by the Federal Court in Nemesis Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCA 1273. In that case the Commissioner asserted that distributions by the Steve Hart Family Trust to other trusts that were discretionary beneficiaries of the Steve Hart Family Trust, each of which had perpetuity periods which extended beyond the MaxPP applicable to the Steve Hart Family Trust, were too remote i.e. violated the perpetuities law and were thus void.

The Commissioner contended that the “wait and see” rule should not save the distributions where the source Steve Hart Family Trust and the relevant receiving beneficiary trust, looked at together, prescribed a period longer than the allowable eighty years applicable to the disposition in the deed of the Steve Hart Family Trust.

Tamberlin J. rejected the Commissioners contention and found that the “wait and see” rule applied to prevent the perpetuities law from invalidating the dispositions even though the receiving trusts might not vest the property they had received from the Steve Hart Family Trust before the expiry of the eighty year MaxPP applicable to property held in the Steve Hart Family Trust. The “wait and see” rule could apply because the trustees of the receiving trusts could act to advance their vesting dates so as to bring them within that MaxPP applicable to property they received from the Steve Hart Family Trust.

Inferences from Nemesis Australia

It follows from Nemesis Australia that the distribution in my example from Trust A to Trust B won’t be void under the perpetuities law as “wait and see” applies even though the income Trust B has from Trust A might not vest until 2095.

Should the trust deed of Trust A constrain distributions to trusts that may vest outside of the eighty year MaxPP applicable to property in Trust A?

Where Trust A distributes income of Trust A to Trust B and a beneficiary B1 of Trust B is presently entitled to that income of Trust B, which originated in Trust A, then B1 has an interest which has vested thus there is no need to “wait and see” any longer to see if the interest has vested: that disposition does not offend the perpetuity law. Where, however, Trust A distributes income or capital of Trust A to Trust B which does not vest in individual or corporate beneficiaries before the MaxPP applicable to Trust A expires then that income or capital will inadvertantly revert to the settlor or to other persons who have funded Trust A.

So the inclusion of a mechanism in discretionary trust deeds which synchronises vesting dates applicable to particular interests in income or capital that are distributed to other trusts with a later vesting day may avoid inadvertant ownership outcomes and liabilities when source discretionary trusts reach the end of their MaxPP. Following Nemesis Australia more radical restriction and control of discretionary trust distributions to other trusts as discretionary beneficiaries does not appear necessary.

Trouble objecting to a tax assessment again

ObjectionIn an earlier blog post we observed that the practical way and thus the only way to challenge Federal and State tax assessments is by objecting against the assessment with an objection.

The Taxation Office raises the tax assessment & decides the objection!

Like the decision to issue a tax assessment, the objection to that assessment, if any, is decided by the (office of the) relevant Federal or State Commissioner of Taxation too. The Commissioner will usually require that the objection is decided by an objections officer other than the officer who raised the tax assessment.

Still, even if that process is followed, an objections officer will be inclined to support the position of their colleague unless the taxpayer can show, with the objection, that the assessment is wrong. The burden of showing it is wrong is on the taxpayer. So the objection needs to make out a convincing case before the tax liability in the tax assessment raised by a colleague will be reduced by the objections officer.

Objection – a one off chance

Where the taxpayer has given the Taxation Office a hastily prepared document objecting against an assessment, the objection right is used up. If the objections officer disallows the objection then the tax law doesn’t give the taxpayer any further right to object against that assessment again.

After an objection against an income tax assessment is disallowed the taxpayer faces the generally expensive option of appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the always expensive option of appeal to the Federal Court. Either way the taxpayer is usually required to appeal within sixty days of the disallowance and will generally be limited to the grounds and arguments raised in the objection unless the taxpayer can convince the tribunal or the court that there are reasons why further grounds not set out in the objection that should be taken into account.

Had the taxpayer known this then he or she may have been more wary about rushing to lodge an objection – in the case of a disputed original income tax assessment, the taxpayer will have either two years or four years following the original notice of assessment to lodge an objection.

It is important that the taxpayer uses this time advisedly to ensure an objection (only one per disputed tax assessment) is prepared which:

  1. demonstates that the tax assessment is wrong; and
  2. establishes grounds of objection rigorous and comprehensive enough to be used in a tribunal or court appeal should the objection be disallowed.

Withdrawal

Sometimes a hastily or inadequately drawn objection doesn’t raise valid grounds at all. The Australian Taxation Office has been known to invite taxpayers to withdraw their objection in these cases. Then they no longer have to decide to disallow the objection. In that situation it may be possible to object again, with better grounds, but it is open to the ATO to contend that the taxpayer has used up their right to object.

It’s clearly best objecting with rigour first time.

Bringing trusts to a timely ending

MovingOnEnding a trust is straight forward, isn’t it? Vest all interests in the trust in beneficiaries and make the right accounting entries and the trust is terminated? Not quite.

That word “vest”. What does it mean? Vest is a technical legal term. Broadly it means to imbue with ownership of property. So, when a trust ends and the property of the trust vests, the beneficiaries of the trust succeed the trustee of the trust as entitled to the property in the trust.

But not all trusts end that way. For instance a unit trust or an unpaid present entitlement may already be vested in a beneficiary or beneficiaries. Clearly something other than vesting is needed to bring trusts of that type to an end. In those cases property that has already vested in beneficiaries may need to be paid to or put in the possession of the beneficiaries too for the trust to end.

Ending is all in the timing

In most states and territories of Australia trusts must vest within a statutory perpetuity period, typically 80 years. From this point this post relates to jurisdictions where a statutory perpetuity period applies.

Trusts that are fully vested, such as bare trusts, fixed trusts, some sorts of unit trusts and “indefinitely continuing” superannuation funds may continue for longer than the perpetuity period. A discretionary trust must vest no later than the perpetuity period, that is, discretions to distribute all income and capital of the trust must be taken and sunset once the time for vesting has been reached otherwise it will be too late and the formula for distribution for “takers-in-default” set out in the trust deed will apply to the property then left in the trust. The divesting of those interests, which are then held by the trustee outright for those beneficiaries, by payment over to, or at the direction of, the beneficiaries, can happen later after the expiry of the perpetuity period.

Bringing forward the ending of a trust

The trust deed should also set out how the time for vesting can be brought forward from the expiry of the perpetuity period. That time of expiry will usually be the “default” time for vesting, or a time just before it, (the last vesting time) in a well-crafted discretionary trust deed.

An objective of winding up a trust is to satisfy all parties with interests, in the wider sense,  in the trust, including creditors, trustees, beneficiaries and the Commissioner of Taxation.

Failure to address these interests of the parties interested, or the trust deed requirements and formalities for the bring forward of the time of vesting, can mean that the trust, or its aftermath, will remain a matter in contention or dispute which is diametrically not what a trustee will want to occur following their effort to bring the trust to an end. A trustee can face difficulty in the converse case too where a trust is inadvertently brought to an end prematurely. In other words trustees can face problems where a trust has a mistimed ending either way. A trust may go on longer than planned or it may be inadvertently brought to an end before the trust should end. An example of the latter is to be found in trust deeds which set an inexplicably early time for vesting many years prior to the expiry of the perpetuity period.

Ending by depletion and merger

Depletion and merger are two other ways a trust may be brought to an end even where the intent of the trustee and beneficiaries is, and the trust deed may suggest that, the trust is to go on for longer.

Depletion is where the trustee no longer holds property on trust. If trust property is depleted and the trustee acquires more property on trust, the arrangement is treated as a new and separate trust. A “resettlement” occurs as well as likely confusion about which trust is which. Hence the device of a “settled sum” for a discretionary trust, which remains as trust property, to ensure continuity of the (original) trust even where the trust is in deficiency and has no other identifiable property.

Merger also brings a trust to an end in an untimely and premature way. Merger occurs where the trustee and the beneficiary are or become the same person. In the case of a merger the trust obligation of the trustee under the terms of the trust is no longer owed to the beneficiary so the trust does not continue.

Merger and SMSFs with individual trustees

Merger can be an interesting issue in the case of a self managed superannuation fund with individual trustees. There is no merger while the fund has two trustees: Trustee A has trust obligations to member B and trustee B has trust obligations to member A. However if a trustee/member dies and the surviving sole trustee is also the sole member of the fund with a fully vested beneficiary account of the entirety of the fund, the fund likely merges. It follows that the fund is no longer a trust. The Commissioner of Taxation has not addressed how the doctrine of merger may apply in these cases, and, as I understand it, the Commissioner treats a fund in this situation as continuing on as a matter of administrative convenience. If the Commissioner’s approach, which may be tantamount to a recognition of a self managed superannuation fund that is not a trust, came before the courts, it is unclear how it might be explained or permitted.

Some starting points

Trusts that require winding up usually commence by and are governed by a trust deed. I am not writing here of testamentary trusts. A trust deed will usually state the requirements to wind up the trust including how the time of vesting must be brought forward. A trust deed may also provide for other things which complicate vesting or winding up, or both. The trust deed may require that a party’s consent is required before either can happen. There may be other forerunner steps which haven’t been taken which must be taken before the trust can vest under the deed. A grasp of the design or method of the trust provisions in the trust deed will build confidence that all requirements for a winding up raised in a trust deed have been identified and addressed.

If the accounts of the trust have been correctly prepared then the current balance sheet, in particular, gives a list of activity to be addressed before the trust can be wound up. For a company liquidation, liabilities need to be satisfied with the balance of assets (property) distributed to owners. Trusts are no different. The more assets have been converted to cash and liabilities have been met the simpler the contemporary balance sheet and the winding up will be.

Tax planning

The conversion of assets to cash can give rise to taxable capital gains and assessable balancing charges but the alternative, their distribution to beneficiaries on a winding up inevitably does so too. It is generally simpler or more tax effective, or both, if these CGT events are contemporaneous with the trust coming to an end.  In the cases of a fixed trust or a unit trust CGT event E4 can occur where a non-assessable part of a capital gain is distributed to a beneficiary when the interest of the beneficiary in the capital of the trust persists.

Errors frustrate the ending

Correct accounting in the trust will follow correct treatment of interests, assets or liabilities in the trust by the trustee. But correct treatment of interests, assets or liabilities doesn’t always happen. Notable examples where correct treatment doesn’t happen include:

  • the elimination of entitlements of family beneficiaries in the course of a winding up. Trustees of discretionary trusts distribute trust income to family members on lower tax rates (A) which remains unpaid and which is treated in the accounts of the trust as an unpaid present entitlement under terms in the trust deed. On winding up the distribution may revert to or may be paid to the principals of the family (B) instead without explanation. That suggests that the present entitlement of beneficiaries to former income of the trust was a sham or misunderstood with potential tax liability for the trustee;
  • distribution in the course of a winding up to individuals where the trust holds money or property sourced from a private company to which Division 7A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 applies. This may be inconsistent with repayment of the money or property to the relevant company and could trigger a “deemed dividend” tax liability; and
  • backdating and forgiveness of loans – it can be tempting for a trustee to purge debts to related parties in the accounts of a trust but the purge is unlikely to be legally effective. A more nuanced treatment, which actually addresses the nature of the original transaction, is more likely to be accepted.

The Commissioner of Taxation investigates, audits and challenges trusts and the parties involved in these kinds of errors including after a winding up.

Conclusion

The affairs of trusts vary greatly and some have deeply intransigent issues. Getting a trust ready to wind up, and executing that wind up at a custom desired point in time may pose a number of challenges which should be considered and addressed in the process. The legal, accounting, business and practical attributes of the trust and possible errors should be considered through the due diligence process so that a non-contentious consignment of the trust to history can be effectively documented.