Tag Archives: trust deeds

When can a trustee favour itself as a beneficiary of a family discretionary trust?

Give it back!

Usually but the answer is nuanced. It is often claimed that a trustee exercising a discretion [Discretion] to favour himself/herself/themselves/itself (HHTI) as a beneficiary of a family discretionary trust (FDT) is acceptable but legal authority for the claim isn’t given. Even the Australian Taxation Office distills the proposition to a sentence. They say:

The trustee may also be a beneficiary, but not the sole beneficiary unless there is more than one trustee.

Trusts, trustees and beneficiaries | Australian Taxation Office

To be fair this comment by the ATO mainly concerns the merger of trusts (considered in our blog post at Bringing trusts to a timely ending ) so maybe full accuracy shouldn’t be expected on the subsidiary point they raise about whether a trustee of a trust may be a beneficiary of the trust.

Conflict of interest

Is not the trustee exercising a Discretion to favour HHTI in a position of conflict of interest? Shouldn’t there be control over a trustee of a trust limiting when the trustee of a trust can exercise the Discretion to favour the trustee?

A primary concern for a trustee who exercises the Discretion is successful suit by a disgruntled beneficiary (DB) where the trustee distributes income or capital of the trust to HHTI instead of to the DB. Another concern is whether the trust is real or a sham: a trustee taking property held on trust for HHI is inconsistent with holding the property on trust.

Fiduciaries

Has a trustee who has done this breached a fiduciary duty?

A trustee is a fiduciary. The law imposes strict standards on a fiduciary:

It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position, such as the plaintiff’s, is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule.

Lord Herschell in Bray v. Ford [1894] AC 44

and

It is perhaps stated most highly against trustee or director in the celebrated speech of Lord Cranworth L.C. in Aberdeen Railway v. Blaikie, where he said: “[a]nd it is a rule of universal application, that no one, having such duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect.

Lord Upjohn in Boardman & Anor v. Phipps [1966] UKHL 2; [1967] 2 AC 46 at page 124

A trustee who exercises the Discretion to favour HHTI can be exposed to suit for breach of fiduciary duty under this line of legal authority.

Impartiality

Another duty of a trustee of a trust is to act impartially between beneficiaries. This duty was described in Cowan v. Scargill:

The starting point is the duty of trustees to exercise their powers in the best interests of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust, holding the scales impartially between different classes of beneficiaries. This duty of the trustees towards their beneficiaries is paramount.

Cowan v. Scargill [1985] Ch 270 at 290-292 (Megarry VC)

Context of trustee power

One may infer from the nineteenth century case authorities cited, in particular, that these duties apply universally to all trustees. The inference is incorrect. In Bray v. Ford the exception ”unless otherwise expressly provided” is significant. Inquiry is needed into the the power given to the trustee to understand whether the rule said to be “inflexible” applies. That is, the extents of the trustee duties of fiduciaries and of impartiality to beneficiaries are at least flexibly ascertained in the context of the power given to the trustee.

In the case of a Discretion in a FDT the trustee will ordinarily be given an explicit power and duty to choose between beneficiaries. In the context of the exercise of a discretionary power in relation to a discretionary trust, there will then be no duty on the trustee to ensure impartiality; that is equal treatment of each beneficiary: Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman [1998] Ch 512, Elovalis V. Elovalis [2008] WASCA 141. In Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman, Scott V-C stated of the rule in Cowan v. Scargill:

Sir Robert Megarry was dealing with an issue regarding the exercise by pension fund trustees of an investment power. He was not dealing with the exercise of a discretionary power to choose which beneficiaries, or which classes of beneficiaries, should be the recipients of trust benefits. In relation to a discretionary power of that character it is, in my opinion, meaningless to speak of a duty on the trustees to act impartially. Trustees, when exercising a discretionary power to choose, must of course not take into account irrelevant, irrational or improper factors. But, provided they avoid doing so, they are entitled to choose and to prefer some beneficiaries over others.

Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman [1998] Ch 512 at p. 533

The limits of FDT trustee power

Adequately cast discretionary powers of a trustee such as given to the trustee of a FDT are thus unlikely to transgress fiduciary and impartiality duties contextually inapplicable to these powers. What checks on the exercise of a Discretion remain? These are explained in Karger v. Paul [1984] VR 161 where it was found that a trustee with an absolute and unfettered discretion must nevertheless exercise the discretion:

  • in good faith;
  • upon a real and genuine consideration of the interests of the beneficiaries; and
  • in accordance with the purpose for which the discretion was conferred.

In this way the obligation on the trustee not to take irrelevant, irrational or improper factors referred to in Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman is put in more positive terms in Australian courts. These benchmarks from Karger v. Paul were applied, and trustees fell short, in Owies v. JJE Nominees Pty Ltd [2022] VSCA 142 and in Wareham v. Marsella [2020] VSCA 92 (which is also considered in this blog at:

Controlling who gets death benefits from a SMSF )

Real and genuine consideration

The real and genuine consideration of the interests of the beneficiaries’ obligation of the trustee on exercising a Discretion will depend on the kind of trust, the interest of the beneficiary in the trust and the standards to be imposed on the type of trustee. For instance in Finch v. Telstra Super Pty. Ltd. [2010] HCA 36, a professional trustee of a large superannuation fund was found to have an amplified real and genuine consideration obligation extending to giving reasons in writing for the exercise or non-exercise of the discretion to pay total and permanent invalidity benefit benefits to a member of the fund.

In contrast an unpaid trustee, such as a family trustee of a FDT, is ordinarily under no obligation to provide the DB with written reasons for a decision to exercise or not exercise a Discretion. Without written reasons the DB can be left with scant evidence to challenge a trustee who instead favours another beneficiary, beneficiaries or HHTI by an exercise of a Discretion under Karger v. Paul benchmarks.

Freedom of a trustee of a FDT to favour beneficiaries including HHTI over others

Within the context and confines of those parameters a trustee of a FDT can favour one beneficiary over another. It follows that a trustee of a FDT can usually exercise a Discretion to favour HHTI to the complete exclusion of the DB so long as the Karger v. Paul parameters are observed.

But power to favour beneficiaries is exceptional

Whether or not there is an exceptional Discretion turns on the purpose for which the Discretion was conferred evident in the terms of the Discretion which is in the trust deed of the trust. An adequate expression of the Discretion in the trust deed of a FDT is expected and needed so its purpose, as an absolute and unfettered discretion to choose between beneficiaries and as to amount distributed to them, is clear.

Certainty of beneficiaries

Who the discretionary beneficiaries of a FDT also must be clear. Frequently a trust deed of a FDT will prescribe persons who are excluded from being a beneficiary of the FDT and occasionally the trustee can be so excluded because of the perceived conflict of interest or, in New South Wales, for a stamp duty reason.

A FDT for a family which includes trustee or trustees included as discretionary beneficiaries is likely to be accepted as genuine:

  • where the trustee is a merely a discretionary beneficiary among a widely cast class of family beneficiaries; and
  • and is understandable where family members of the family sought to benefit under trust terms are or could be trustees.

So a trust deed of a FDT should be checked to confirm that the trustee is a beneficiary of the trust before the trustee of a FDT exercises a Discretion to distribute to itself. It is only where the trustee qualifies as a discretionary beneficiary under the terms of the trust instrument that a distribution can be safely made to the trustee/beneficiary where the trustee is satisfied that the distribution complies with the Karger v. Paul parameters.

The drafting of the FDT deed

Ideally the trust instrument will expressly confirm that the trustee of the FDT is a beneficiary. It can be the case that the trustee is a member of a class which is included as beneficiaries under the trust instrument but the trust deed might not expressly say that a trustee can be a beneficiary. An exercise of the Discretion in the favour of the trustee is likely OK then too but the trustee runs a risk and could possibly face action asserting the trust instrument ought to be construed on a basis that the trustee is unacceptable as a beneficiary.

Can a family discretionary trust distribute income to its corporate trustee?

Businesswoman piggybank desk

A family discretionary trust (FDT) often has a corporate trustee (TCo) for limited liability and other reasons. With a private company able to access a 30% or lower tax rate on an income distribution received from a FDT, distribution to a private company such as TCo can be a way to access a lower company income rate for a family that does not own or control a private company aside from TCo out of thrift.

But is it a good idea?

Distribution by a FDT to its corporate trustee, TCo, as a “bucket company”, is not necessarily allowable or advisable.

It needs to be understood that FDT deed terms, quality of the FDT deed and FDT set up, including attention to who is a beneficiary of the FDT, vary widely across Australia.

TCo needs to be a beneficiary of the FDT

FDT distributions can only be made to beneficiaries of the FDT. It follows that TCo would need to be entitled in its own right as a beneficiary to a distribution under the terms of the FDT deed. TCo may or may not be a named discretionary beneficiary under the FDT deed.

Many FDT deeds provide for a class of discretionary beneficiary which includes companies owned or controlled by a (some other) beneficiary of the FDT. Sometimes this class is referred to as “eligible corporations” which the FDT deed terms state become beneficiaries of the FDT. These provisions in FDT deeds, if they exist, vary too. Sometimes qualification within a corporate class of discretionary beneficiary turns on someone who qualifies as a beneficiary in the deed:

  • owning shares in the company; or
  • being a director of the company;

and it can be just one or the other and not necessarily both.

It can’t be assumed that:

  • beneficiary qualification in these ways is possible; or
  • that TCo meets these beneficiary qualifications;

without checking the FDT deed.

Consequences of distributing income to a non-beneficiary

Consequences of a FDT distributing trust income to a person or company who is not a beneficiary under the deed of a FDT can be:

  • failure of the distribution for legal and tax purposes so that the trustee of the FDT is assessed under section 99A of the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1936 with income tax at the highest marginal rate; and/or
  • treatment of the FDT and distributions from the FDT as a sham by the Australian Taxation Office, other government departments, creditors or others.

Even where TCo may appear to qualify as a beneficiary due to the above, many FDT deeds have overriding exclusionary provisions which exclude persons and companies otherwise specified as beneficiaries from being beneficiaries for various reasons:

Excluded beneficiaries – conflict of interest

Frequently a trustee of a FDT is excluded from being a beneficiary because the trustee, which can exercise the discretion to select discretionary beneficiaries, is in a position of conflict of interest and so TCo, despite qualification as a beneficiary otherwise, is ultimately excluded from being a beneficiary of the FDT. More commonly FDT deeds contain other means which allow a family to control who becomes and acts as a trustee which displaces or should displace inapt conflict of interest considerations as a control redundancy within the deed.

Excluded beneficiaries – stamp duty

But even then a trustee, such as TCo, that may otherwise have qualified as a beneficiary, may still be excluded as a beneficiary by the FDT deed for stamp duty reasons. In New South Wales, in particular, an entitlement to concessional duty under sub-section 54(3) of the Duties Act (NSW) 1997 on a change of trustee of a trust that owns dutiable property can be lost where the a trustee can participate as a beneficiary of the trust.

The consequence of that is a change of trustee of a FDT, say by deed, is treated as a fully ad valorem dutiable transfer of all of the NSW dutiable property of the FDT to the new trustee/s.

Although this limitation of a duty concession varies from other exemptions and concessions applicable to changes of trustee of trusts in states and territories other than NSW, FDT deeds frequently exclude trustees from being beneficiaries out of an abundance of caution that this or a similar stamp duty concession may be lost where the trustee of the FDT is not excluded.

TCo can qualify as a beneficiary  – but what then?

If it can be confirmed that TCo does qualify as a beneficiary and is not ultimately excluded as a beneficiary under the trust deed of a FDT, distribution to TCo, rather than another discrete company is still not necessarily a good idea.

Managing TCo’s asset mix

Should TCo receive income from a FDT, and so come to have assets in its own right, TCo will need to manage its assets to ensure that property it holds in its own right and property TCo holds for the FDT are not mixed. A trustee of a trust has a fiduciary duty not to mix trust property with property held not on that trust. This trustee duty is often explicitly set out in FDT deeds.

In terms of title, property distributed to TCo in its own right will be indistinguishable so, without careful accounting and administration of TCo’s activities to ensure trust property isn’t mixed with non-trust property, there is the prospect that a family in control of a FDT may lose track of in which capacity the TCo is owning property and doing things. It will often fall to the accountant of the FDT to sort this out unless the FDT has a very capable and aware functionary administering the FDT for the trustee.

Serious tax risk of losing track of how TCo owns what

Tax risks of unpaid present entitlements (UPE) of TCo in its own right are also high following the recent Draft Taxation Determination TD 2022/D1 Income tax: Division 7A: when will an unpaid present entitlement or amount held on sub-trust become the provision of ‘financial accommodation’? – see our blog post – Draft ATO reimbursement agreement suite out in the wake of Guardian AIT https://wp.me/p6T4vg-q6. Under that draft determination a UPE of a FDT to a private company not detected and promptly repaid (has TCo repaid TCo?) or dealt with under a section 109N of the ITAA 1936 loan agreement, by the time the tax return of the company beneficiary for the income year in which the UPE arises is due, will likely precipitate a deemed and unfrankable dividend to the FDT.

Understanding a company can’t enter into a legally enforceable agreement with itself how could TCo even comply with section 109N as a way to avoid a deemed dividend?

Is distributing to TCo worth it?

Despite the above distribution by FDTs to their corporate trustee as a bucket company is commonplace but done without a keen appreciation of the risks of doing so. I don’t encourage FDTs to distribute to their own trustee even when I am familiar with the trust deed of the FDT. I appreciate there is a cost saving but the costs of running a separate “bucket company”, including the setup and annual ASIC fees and accounting costs, are or should be relatively low so be wary that multi-purposing of TCo can be a false economy for many families with FDTs when the above is taken into account.

Image by Freepik

A dentist might be better than the cheapest guy with a drill

drill

Proprietary company setups are not all the same. The $512 ASIC registration fee doesn’t get you a constitution for your company. Company constitutions vary and are on a quality spectrum and quality can count just like with any product.

Is a company constitution worth having?

A company set up without a constitution gets a one size fits call called the replaceable rules which gives a bare bones way for the company, and those involved in it, to operate. One size fits all can lead to a unintended outcomes. For instance an often unforeseen, easy to trip, requirement is to notify other directors of a conflict of interest between a director and the company. A properly tailored company constitution can modify conflict of interest rules away from the one size fits all to suit a company where only mum and dad are directors. Failure to do this can get weaponised like, say, when directors get divorced. And don’t think that this is the only reason why the replaceable rules may be a poor fit for your company.

Getting a capital structure of a company right

I do work sorting out situations made worse because companies are not understood by those setting them up. A company’s ideal capital structure is a big issue when a company is acting in its own right and not a trustee. Unless you understand the impact of s112-20 of the ITAA 1997 on the issue of shares in the company you’re a big chance to pay more capital gains tax that you might have when you sell or exit out of a company that has grown.

Company capital structure fails can lead to unnecessary loss of small business CGT concessions for small business which can amount to a big economic cost where a company ends up being a good business.

Getting “my” money out of a company

Shareholders try to get “their” money out of a company following a poorly executed lawyer free setup is another world of grief which can ironically bring in the lawyers, the ATO and expensive insolvency specialists.

A reckoning on death

Lots of problems don’t show up until a shareholder dies. This is often when the problem comes to my desk. It is sad when a family is tied in knots because their company establishment going way back was stuffed up. Any company setup, whichever way, might seem the same through times of smooth sailing. Why bother with the pesky paperwork at all? Wait, too, until the shareholders divorce, a fight amongst shareholders ensues or there is trading or tax trouble with the company: a sudden turn of interest, then, in the company’s capital, structure and records.

The “professional services” industry – escape for profit

Most of the non-legal providers on the internet are suss. They are derived from the offshore tax haven shell company “professional services” industry or use their business model. ICIJ media gives you an idea of their ethics https://cutt.ly/oUO7bvW and how they help their customers deal with local rules and commitments (not). Their model is to hide and escape from them.

Company constitutions, trust and SMSF deeds and partnership agreements are legal documents, and these providers are there to help you escape from having to get them from a lawyer charging a fee who is ethically obliged to professionally prepare them and whose work is covered by a professional indemnity/negligence insurance to protect you. And what about these rights? What a solicitor must tell you https://go.ly/P0jLU Worth having?

Their model is often something like this: we are not lawyers, so we give you escape from lawyers with this service. But we offer documents which are (based on) documents authored by a lawyer.

Reality check on unqualified legal practice

However you take this double-think pitch on the merits of avoiding lawyers, a reality is that the model is illegal: see the Federal Court case of Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v. Murray [2002] FCA 1252 https://jade.io/article/106192 to appreciate how documents supplied this way is from an unqualified legal practice source.

Ah! lawyers

There is a misconception that lawyers in this space are not worth the fees. I, for one, reckon my operation is lean and mean. And there are others like me. Sure my company and trust setup services cost a little more because my setups involve me thinking about and taking responsibility for what I am asked to do, and guiding clients on their setup choices based on what I know about them and thirty-five years’ experience of the ever changing traps – and that can’t be done by AI, yet.

What you get

So I can’t “compete” with a non-thinking service which gives you a company, trust or SMSF setup from a sausage cutter: documents all done and delivered instantaneously, with your credit card charged just as fast. But you get my drift: this blindingly impressive service just may be just too fast, hassle-free and brain-free. Look at the fine print (hello accountants) about who takes responsibility for loss if anything, including data inputs for which the inputter is made fully responsible, turn out not quite right.

So I agree. It just might be better to go to a dentist than the cheapest guy with a drill.

This post is actually from a post I made to another blog.  I think it’s worth another post on this blog even though it’s a more unruly and uncompromising than my usual posts here!

Should our SMSF have kept its Principal Employer?

MissingPiece

Last month’s piece Lost SMSF trust deed replacement deeds – are they a scam? is my exposé of SMSF (self managed superannuation fund) trust deed variation techniques revealed as dodgy in the light of high Australian legal authority there set out.

So my exposé can be better appreciated and understood: this month I turn to some typical dilemmas faced by a SMSF trustee trying to update SMSF trust terms to:

  • keep them up to date with changing superannuation and tax laws; and
  • introduce capabilities so that opportunities presented by current regimes impacting superannuation funds can be effectively used.

To bring in the new, keep the old

One can see from my exposé that, to introduce new SMSF trust terms to a SMSF, a trustee needs to paradoxically keep the old.

Possibly no starker reminder of this are older SMSFs where the power of vary trust terms in the original trust deed (OTD) unconditionally requires the Principal Employer (or the “Employer” or the “Founding Employer”  – descriptions of this substantially similar role from the days of employer-sponsored superannuation vary) to initiate or consent to update trust terms of the SMSF.

My exposé further explains:

  • aside from in the narrowest of exceptions, a valid deed to vary SMSF trust terms requires a rigid adherence to the requirements of the power to vary trust terms contained in the OTD of the SMSF; and
  • an update or change to the power to vary in a SMSF OTD made on a misunderstanding that the power to vary allows amendment of the power to vary itself, when it doesn’t, is ineffective.

Invalid replacement of the power to vary

Say:

On that misunderstanding by a deed provider (unfortunately I can’t say deed lawyer here because, due to regulatory failings, SMSF legal documents with these errors are often supplied by non-lawyer outfits these days), the deed provider supplies a deed to vary SMSF trust terms by which the trustee purports to replace, among other trust terms, the power to vary in the OTD which power is replaced with the deed provider’s own contemporary take on an apt power to vary.

The SMSF trustee then considers the “replaced” power to vary which no longer requires the trustee to:

  • obtain the consent of the Principal Employer to vary trust terms; or
  • to take direction on the varied trust terms from the Principal Employer;

and decides that the redundant office of Principal Employer, no longer necessary with the evolution from employer-sponsored superannuation to self managed superannuation, can cease. The Principal Employer, say a company, is then de-registered and the office of Principal Employer under the SMSF lapses.

Marooned without a Principal Employer

As the “replaced” power to vary is of no effect this leaves the trustee unable to vary the SMSF trust terms further in future where there is no Principal Employer who can act under the power to vary from the OTD of the SMSF.

A question also arises whether the deed inserting the “replaced” power to vary also fails in its entirety where it contains an invalid replacement of the power to vary in the OTD. The answer to that question may vary case to case.

One can be more certain that deeds purporting to vary SMSF trust terms non-compliant with the power to vary in the OTD unconditionally requiring the consent etc. of the Principal Employer, will fail.

Other dated requirements in the power to vary

In retrospect many of the provisos which providers of SMSF OTDs included in powers to vary in SMSF OTDs seem unwise. Examples include provisos in powers to vary in OTDs that the trustee obtain the approval of:

  • the Commissioner of Taxation; or
  • the Insurance and Superannuation Commission;

to amendment of trust terms of the SMSF. These days the Commissioner of Taxation as the regulator of SMSFs is loathe to give such approval, which is not required by legislation, and the office of Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner no longer exists.

Unfortunately some old SMSF OTDs have these kinds of provisions and some way to deal with them needs to be worked out so that amendment compliant with the power to vary can take effect.

The right “applicable law”?

Powers to vary in SMSF OTDs frequently refer to an “applicable law”, or similar, broadly being the law that applied to SMSFs when the OTD was prepared. “Applicable law”, or whatever it may be, is usually defined in the OTD separately from the power to vary. When SMSF trust terms are generally updated, years later, the varied terms are understandably predicated on a different updated “applicable law”.

In my reckoning this means a deed varying SMSF trust terms probably needs to recognise and define two kinds of “applicable law” where compliance with “applicable law” is a proviso of the power to vary in the OTD:

  • firstly the statutes, regulations etc. that are apply to the SMSF under its updated terms; and
  • secondly the older laws prescribed as “applicable law” in the OTD, which may be redundant or repealed, which the trustee of the SMSF must nevertheless comply with to effectuate an update of trust terms in accordance with the power to vary in the OTD. The power to vary should then specifically refer to this second variety of “applicable law”. Restatement of these older laws can get complicated. For instance the Occupational Superannuation Standards Act 1987, which is often justifiably included as a component of “applicable law” in older superannuation OTDs, has been progressively renamed to the Superannuation Entities (Taxation) Act 1987,  the Superannuation (Excluded Funds) Taxation Act 1987 and the Superannuation (Self Managed Superannuation Funds) Taxation Act 1987.

An alternative view is that one stipulation of “applicable law” can suffice for the other on a reasonable interpretation of the OTD a court or tribunal may accept. That may be somewhat tenable if the OTD contains a interpretative provision contemplating amendments and re-enactments of statutes.

Still it is discomforting to rely on that interpretation of “applicable law” when the OTD specifically and restrictively defines what “applicable law” is and makes compliance with such “applicable law” a proviso to the power to vary. Adoption of multiple concepts of “applicable law” being:

  • one to support updated trust terms; and
  • the other to ground variations of the deed using the power to vary;

is a safer course in a deed to vary trust terms where “applicable law” is a proviso built into the power to vary in the OTD.

Challenges!

Proactive management of a SMSF with timely and effective amendment of SMSF trust terms to support that management can be a much more demanding and technical task then many will appreciate. It may pay for a SMSF trustee to carefully consider what the SMSF power to vary requirements in the OTD are, and what service the SMSF will be getting, rather than expecting that some plain vanilla SMSF deed amendment service is going to work.

Lost SMSF trust deed replacement deeds – are they a scam?

The writer has been reading about opportunity to replace lost trust deeds with a replacement deed from professional suppliers of replacement trust deeds, in SMSF Adviser and in other places. The writer is unconvinced that these replacement deeds are going to be legally effective particularly in relation to trust deeds to which the law in New South Wales applies.

Trust deeds lost in SA – Jowill Nominees Pty Ltd v. Cooper

On 2 July 2021 SMSF Adviser suggested that the South Australian case Jowill Nominees Pty Ltd v. Cooper [2021] SASC 76 provides an insight into issues a court will consider when a trust deed has been lost. This case concerned how trust rules of a trust governed by South Australian law can be varied by the SA Supreme Court on the application of the trustee pursuant to section 59C of the Trustee Act (SA) 1936. In the writer’s view this decision says nothing about variation of trust rules beyond the confine of a SA Supreme Court section 59C application.

Section 59C differs from the Trustee Acts to similar effect in other Australian jurisdictions including section 81 of the Trustee Act (NSW) 1925.

Regularity supports that there is a SMSF where its deed is lost

Where a trust, such as a self managed superannuation fund (SMSF), has been running for some time the trustee may be able to rely on the presumption of regularity to support the operation of the trust where the trust deed is lost.

The presumption of regularity is an evidentiary rule. It can apply where there is a gap in evidence about a prior act but where later acts and circumstances indicate likelihood that the prior act was performed. So in:

  • Sutherland v. Woods [2011] NSWSC 13 the NSW Supreme Court accepted that a SMSF trust deed and resolutions of a trustee of an active SMSF were signed on balance of probability although signed versions of these documents were missing from the evidence in the case; and
  • Re Thomson [2015] VSC 370 the Victorian Supreme Court treated a SMSF as operative in conformity with trust rules in a supposed later deed of variation even though an earlier deed of variation of the trust deed of the SMSF was lost and only an unexecuted version of the later deed of variation of the trust deed was available in evidence. Probabilities, and the surrounding facts such as the ongoing acceptance of the accounts of the SMSF based on the supposed later deed of variation, indicated likelihood that these deeds of variation had been completed and executed.

It is clear from the cases where the presumption of regularity is sought to be relied on that a court or tribunal will presume to aid a trustee unable to produce a missing deed only after an exhaustive search by the trustee for it:

He cannot presume in his own favour that things are rightly done if inquiry that he ought to make would tell him that they were wrongly done. 

Lord Simons in  Morris v. Kanssen  [1946] AC 459 at p. 475

Where a trustee of a trust, that has lost the trust deed of the trust, finds itself in dispute with the Commissioner of Taxation the presumption of regularity can counter the burden of proving the establishment of the trust on the trustee imposed by Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act (C’th) 1953. See our post The burden of proof in a tax objection

The presumption of regularity is of procedural and not of substantive aid to establishing that a trust has been operating for some time in conformity with a valid and effective trust deed containing trust terms consistent with that operation where the trust deed cannot be produced. In the absence of evidence of the precise terms of a power of amendment, which is an exceptional power that can’t be presumed, the presumption of regularity, though, gives no substantial basis for amendment of trust terms to bring the terms of a SMSF trust deed back to terms that can be produced:

94. Variation of the terms of a trust (including by way of conferral of some new power on the trustee) is not something within the ordinary and natural province of a trustee. It is not something that it is “expedient” that a trustee should do; nor, fundamentally, is it something that is done “in the management or administration of” trust property. A trustee’s function is to take the trusts as it finds them and to administer them as they stand. The trustee is not concerned to question the terms of the trust or seek to improve them. I venture to say that, even where the trust instrument itself gives the trustee a power of variation, exercise of that power is not something that occurs “in the management or administration of” trust property. It occurs in order that the scheme of fiduciary administration of the property may somehow be reshaped.

Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367 at para 94

It follows that the presumption of regularity gives the trustee latitude to administer a trust on a presumed generic basis consistent with how that trust has been administered since inception where the trustee cannot produce the trust deed containing the trust terms. That presumption, though, would not ground alteration of trust terms where terms of a power of amendment which may not exist at all, cannot be specifically drawn on from the original trust instrument and complied with.

Law on amending lost trust deeds

How terms of a trust governed by the laws of New South Wales can be varied was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367. Re Dion Investments concerned an application to the Supreme Court to vary a trust deed of a trust by modernising its provisions for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. In the writer’s view it is this Court of Appeal decision (by Barrett JA, whose decision Beazley P and Gleeson JA agreed with), not Jowill Nominees Pty Ltd v. Cooper, that gives insights into issues courts and tribunals, especially those in NSW, will consider when the effectiveness of instruments to amend trust terms:

  • where the trust deed of the trust has been lost and the power of amendment is not precisely known; or
  • in other circumstances where the variation to trust terms sought is not supported by, or are beyond, the power of amendment contained in the trust instrument such as in Re Dion Investments;

is to be considered.

Alteration of a trust by its founders

In the absence of a reserved power of amendment in a trust deed, can the trustee and the founders of a trust take action by a subsequent deed to vary an original trust deed (OTD)? The NSW Court of Appeal in Re Dion Investments indicates not. Barrett JA dispels this possibility where trusts and powers of the trust have been “defined” in an OTD:

41. Where an express trust is established in that way by a deed made between a settlor and the initial trustee to which the settled property is transferred, rights of the beneficiaries arise immediately the deed takes effect. The beneficiaries are not parties to the deed and, to the extent that it embodies covenants given by its parties to one another, the beneficiaries are strangers to those covenants and cannot sue at law for breach of them. The beneficiaries’ rights are equitable rights arising from the circumstance that the trustee has accepted the office of trustee and, therefore, the duties and obligations with respect to the trust property (and otherwise) that that office carries with it.

42. Any subsequent action of the settlor and the original trustee to vary the provisions of the deed made by them will not be effective to affect either the rights and interests of the beneficiaries or the duties, obligations and powers of the trustee. Those two parties have no ability to deprive the beneficiaries of those rights and interests or to vary either the terms of the trust that the trustee is bound to execute and uphold or the powers that are available to the trustee in order to do so. The terms of the trust have, in the eyes of equity, an existence that is independent of the provisions of the deed that define them.

Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367 at paras 41 to 42

Barrett JA then illustrates the point by this example:

43. Let it be assumed that on Monday the settlor and the trustee execute and deliver the trust deed (at which point the settled sum changes hands) and that on Tuesday they execute a deed revoking the original deed and stating that their rights and obligations are as if it had never existed. Unless some power of revocation of the trusts has been reserved, the subsequent action does not change the fact that the trustee holds the settled sum for the benefit of beneficiaries named in the original deed and upon the trusts stated in that deed. The covenants of a deed may be discharged or varied by another deed between the same parties (West v Blakeway (1841) 2 Man & G 751; 133 ER 940) but the equitable rights and interests of a beneficiary cannot be taken away or varied by anyone unless the terms of the trust itself (or statute) so allow.

Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367 at para 43

Alteration of a trust by all beneficiaries of a trust

SMSF Adviser and some SMSF deed suppliers express the view that persons who can compel the due administration of the trust can complete a replacement deed that varies and replaces a lost SMSF trust deed.

This view relies on a rule of equity from Saunders v. Vautier (1841) [1841] EWHC J82, 4 Beav 115, 49 ER 282. The rule is that where all of the beneficiaries of a trust are sui juris (of adult age and under no legal disability), the beneficiaries may require the trustee to transfer the trust property to them and terminate the trust. In Re Dion Investments, Barrett JA. recognises that this rule can entitle beneficiaries relying on the rule to require that the trustee hold the trust property on varied trusts:

but, if they do so require, the situation may in truth be one of resettlement upon new trusts rather than variation of the pre-existing trusts (and the trustee may not be compellable to accept and perform those new trusts: see CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2005] HCA 53; 224 CLR 98 at [44]).

Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367 at para 46

For a trust that is a SMSF impediments to and implications of variation by the force of using the rule from Saunders v. Vautier are:

  • relatives and other dependants beyond the members of a SMSF, being all of the beneficiaries, must consent to using the rule from Saunders v. Vautier. Children, and others lacking legal capacity, who cannot consent to using the rule, are beneficiaries who can complicate use of the rule to vary a SMSF trust: Kafataris v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 1454; and
  • if the beneficiaries do apply the rule from Saunders v. Vautier, resettlement of a SMSF trust on taking that action gives rise to:
    • CGT event E1 or E2 for each of the CGT assets of the SMSF under Part 3-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. It follows that action taken by SMSF beneficiaries in reliance on the rule from Saunders v. Vautier will have comparable capital gains tax consequences to a transfer of all members’ benefits to a newly established SMSF; and
    • prospect that a new ABN and election to become a regulated superannuation fund for a new resettled SMSF will by required by the regulator.

Much reliance is placed by SMSF Adviser and by deed suppliers’ websites promoting replacement deed services on Re Bowmil Nominees Pty. Ltd. [2004] NSWSC 161. In Re Bowmil Nominees Pty. Ltd. . Hamilton J of the NSW Supreme Court, as a matter of expediency, allowed beneficiaries to vary a SMSF trust deed beyond limitations in the amendment power in the trust deed utilising the rule in Saunders v. Vautier on this basis:

20. Since it is appropriate that the trustee act upon the informed consent of beneficiaries who are sui juris and unnecessary applications to the Court for empowerment are not to be encouraged, I propose to adopt the course followed by Baragwanath J in the New Zealand case. I do not propose to make an order under s 81 of the TA empowering the making of the amendment, although I have expressed the view that the Court has power to do so and would be prepared to do so if it were necessary. Rather, I shall make an appropriate declaratory order to the effect that it is expedient that the proposed deed of amendment be entered into and that it will be appropriate for the trustee to act in accordance with it.

Re Bowmil Nominees Pty. Ltd. [2004] NSWSC 161 at para. 20

Update of trust terms by a court

The Court of Appeal in Re Dion Investments agreed with Young AJ, the primary judge, that post-1997 court decisions, including Re Bowmil Nominees Pty. Ltd., which relied on a misunderstanding of the extent of court power to vary trust deeds, particularly in relation to the statutory powers of a court to alter the terms of the trust viz. the aforementioned section 81 in NSW and section 59C in SA, which misunderstanding originated from this obiter dicta of Baragwanath J in Re Philips New Zealand Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 93

The Court will not willingly construe a deed so as to stultify the ability of trustees, having proper consents, to amend a deed to bring it into line with changing conditions.

Re Philips New Zealand Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 93 at page 99

were not correctly decided. Barrett JA said:

100. For these reasons, I share the opinion of the primary judge that the post-1997 decisions that have proceeded on the basis that variation of the terms of a trust is, of itself, a “transaction” within the contemplation of s 81(1) rest on an unsound foundation. The court is not empowered by the section to grant power to the trustee to amend the trust instrument or the terms of the trust. It may only grant specific powers related to the management and administration of the trust property, being powers that co-exist with (and, to the extent of any inconsistency, override) those conferred by the trust instrument or by law.

Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367 at para 100

In particular. the decision in Re Bowmil Nominees Pty. Ltd. and the other post-1997 decisions referred to in Re Dion Investments cannot be reconciled with the Court of Appeal decision in Re Dion Investments where Barrett JA found:

96. In such cases, however, the creation of what is, in terms, a power of the trustee to amend the trust instrument is a superfluous and meaningless step. When the court, acting under s 81(1), confers on a trustee power to undertake a particular dealing (or dealings of a particular kind), “it must be taken to have done it as though the power which is being put into operation had been inserted in the trust instrument as an overriding power”: Re Mair [1935] Ch 562 at 565 per Farwell J. The substantive power that the court gives comes into existence by virtue of the court’s order. It does not have its source in the terms of the trust. There is no addition to the content of the trust instrument. That content is supplemented and overridden “as though” some addition had been made to it. The terms of the trust are reshaped accordingly.

97. Conferral of specific new powers pursuant to s 81(1) should not be by way of purported grant of authority to amend the trust instrument so that it provides for the new powers. Rather, the court’s order should directly confer (and be the sole and direct source of) the powers which then supplement and, as necessary, override the content of the trust instrument. And, of course, the only specific powers that can be conferred in that direct way are those that fall within the s 81(1) description concerned with management and administration of trust property.

Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367 at paras 96-97

A variation relying on a power of amendment in trust terms is not a variation of a trust deed but a variation of trust terms contained in a trust deed. Barrett JA explained this in Re Dion Investments:

44. It is, of course, commonplace to speak of the variation of a trust instrument as such when referring to what is, in truth, variation of the terms upon which trust property is held under the trusts created or evidenced by the instrument. A provision of a trust instrument that lays down procedures by which it may be varied is, of its nature, concerned with variation of the terms of the trust, not variation of the content of the instrument, although the fact that it is the instrument that sets out the terms of the trust does, in an imprecise way, make it sensible to speak of amendment of the instrument when the reference is in truth to amendment of the terms of the trust.

45. Where the trust instrument contains a provision allowing variation by a particular process, the situation is one in which the settlor, in declaring the trust and defining its terms, has specified that those terms are not immutable and that the original terms will be superseded by varied terms if the specified process of variation (entailing, in concept, a power of appointment or a power of revocation or both) is undertaken. The varied terms are in that way traceable to the settlor’s intention as communicated to the original trustee.

Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. [2014] NSWCA 367 at paras 44-45

Significance of the power of amendment as expressed in an OTD

A power of amendment of a SMSF, or any other express trust, is a precise reflection of the settlor’s (founder’s) intention of conditions for amendment of the trust communicated in the trust terms in the OTD and supplies the only lawful way trust rules in a trust deed, otherwise immutable, can be amended aside from narrow exceptions:

  • where beneficiaries can invoke the rule in Saunders v. Vautier and, by doing so, resettle the SMSF on a new trust; or
  • by court order to vary trust terms or, in NSW, to allow dealings of a particular kind despite trust terms, in accordance with a state or territory Trustee Acts such as section 59C of the Trustee Act (SA) 1936 and section 81 of the Trustee Act (NSW) 1925;

as considered above.

Amendment practice

It follows that a power of amendment in an OTD of a trust:

  • needs to remain, as it was in the OTD, as a term of the trust unless the power of amendment itself can be amended, should that be possible and has so been amended; and
  • is best extracted, repeated and given prominence in a deed of variation which replaces the other trust terms of a trust so that trust terms are clear and traceable on an ongoing basis.

Extraction and repeat of a reserved power of amendment from an OTD is not always just a matter of extracting the paragraph or paragraphs in the OTD containing the power of amendment. In the writer’s experience powers of amendment in older SMSF OTDs are frequently premised on laws and practices that prevailed when the superannuation trust was established e.g. such as in the former Occupational Superannuation Standards Act (C’th) 1987 and practices relating to now redundant regimes of employer sponsored superannuation. To remain traceable to the settlor’s (founder’s) intention as communicated to the original trustee, conditions specified for amendment in a power of amendment based on laws and practices, even where those laws and practices have evolved or become redundant since establishment of the trust; need to be complied with and reflected cogently in the extraction and repeat of the power of amendment in a deed of variation, within reason, if the power of amendment is to remain as a trust term in an exercisable form in the deed of variation.

When can a power of amendment in an OTD itself be amended?

Amendment of the power of amendment itself may be possible but unlikely if the amendment provision in the OTD itself does not expressly permit it. In Jenkins v. Ellett [2007] QSC 154, Douglas J. stated:

The scope of powers of amendment of a trust deed is discussed in an illuminating fashion in Thomas on Powers (1st ed., 1998) at pp. 585-586, paras 14-31 to 14-32 in these terms:

“In all cases, the scope of the relevant power is determined by the construction of the words in which it is couched, in accordance with the surrounding context and also of such extrinsic evidence (if any) as may be properly admissible. A power of amendment or variation in a trust instrument ought not to be construed in a narrow or unreal way. It will have been created in order to provide flexibility, whether in relation to specific matters or more generally. Such a power ought, therefore, to be construed liberally so as to permit any amendment which is not prohibited by an express direction to the contrary or by some necessary implication, provided always that any such amendment does not derogate from the fundamental purposes for which the power was created ….It does not follow, of course, that the power of amendment itself can be amended in this way. Indeed, it is probably the case that there is an implied (albeit rebuttable) presumption, in the absence of an express direction to that effect, that a power of amendment (like any other kind of power) cannot be used to extend its own scope or amend its own terms. Moreover, a power of amendment is not likely to be held to extend to varying the trust in a way which would destroy its ‘substratum’. The underlying purpose for the furtherance of which the power was initially created or conferred will obviously be paramount.”

Jenkins v. Ellett [2007] QSC 154 Douglas J. at paragraph 15

One can see the parity between what was said in Jenkins v. Ellett and in Thomas on Powers and in paragraph 94 in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd., as set out above, about a trustee’s proper role not being concerned to question or improve trust terms. See the writer’s article Redoing the deed https://wp.me/P6T4vg-3x#rtd

Update of the power of amendment?

The writer sees confusion among SMSF deed suppliers over the difference between the OTD and the trust terms in the OTD and who consequently fall into the trap of treating the power to amend as updatable by the same power to amend.

So instead of relocating the power of amendment in the OTD to updated trust terms, suppliers simply replace that power with their own take on an apt power of amendment departing from Barrett JA’s dictum that it is not for the trustee, far less a variation deed supplier, to “question the terms of the trust or seek to improve them”. Following Re Dion Investments and Jenkins v. Ellett a replacement of a power of amendment that is not amendable is a deviation from the power of amendment prone to be:

  • beyond the power of:
    • the parties entrusted with the power of amendment; and
    • a court, even if an order of the court for the replacement power had been sought; and
  • thus void.

Later deeds of variation of SMSFs based on a deviation

As in Re Thomson trust deeds of SMSFs will likely be varied more than once so that trust terms (governing rules) can better reflect evolving law and practice with SMSFs. An unlawful replacement of a power of amendment which deviates from the power of amendment in the OTD of a SMSF lays a trap when a trustee seeks to make a further amendment to the trust terms of the SMSF: Based on the above authorities a further deed of variation reliant on the “updated” power of amendment in an earlier deed of variation, rather than the power of variation in the even earlier OTD of the SMSF, will fail and be void unless the updated power of amendment in the earlier deed of variation is in conformity with the power of amendment in the OTD.

So are replacement SMSF trust deeds a scam?

The writer suspects many SMSF deed suppliers who supply replacement SMSF deeds don’t understand or follow the implications of Re Dion Investments. As a considered NSW Court of Appeal decision Re Dion Investments is binding legal precedent that rejects the authority of first instance NSW Supreme Court decisions referred to and discussed by the Court of Appeal, including Re Bowmil Nominees Pty. Ltd., that rest on an “unsound foundation” .

It is unfortunate that these cases are still being used as spurious authority on the websites of SMSF deed suppliers in support of claims that lost SMSF deed replacement deeds are of greater efficacy as variations of a trust deed than courts and tribunals, especially NSW courts, will be prepared to accept or order following Re Dion Investments. The writer wouldn’t say these claims are a scam necessarily because, as this post shows, the present state of law is complicated, difficult and more restrictive than understood by courts in the post-1997 cases referred to in Re Dion Investments.

The current law appears to be that if a trustee wants to vary a SMSF trust deed, which is “not something within the ordinary and natural province of a trustee” especially in NSW, the parties given power to amend under a power of amendment must locate, have and rely on that power in or derived from the OTD to successfully amend terms of a SMSF trust without resettling it.

Other solutions, aside from supreme court applications allowed under:

  • section 81 of the Trustee Act (NSW) 1925, as pursued in Re Dion Investments
  • section 59C of the Trustee Act (SA) 1936, as pursued in Jowill Nominees Pty Ltd v. Cooper; or
  • comparable legislation in other Australian states and territories;

which are expensive litigation, are unlikely to be legally effective.

It follows that every effort should be made to find trust terms in an OTD so that the power of amendment in the deed will be carefully complied with when an amendment of a trust deed is to be undertaken. That includes where there have been earlier deeds of variation of the trust terms of a SMSF whose validity also rests on, and must be derived from the reserved amendment power defined in the OTD.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author acknowledges the articles:

  • A matter of trusts – Presumption of regularity to the rescue? Milton Louca and Phil Broderick, Taxation in Australia March 2018 at page 436
  • The powers of a Court to vary the terms of a trust A consideration of in Re Dion Investments Pty. Ltd. (2014) 87 NSWLR 753 A paper presented to the Society of Trust and Estates Practitioners – NSW Branch Wednesday 21 October 2015 by Denis Barlin of counsel (who appeared as counsel for the section 81 applicant in the case)

that were useful in preparing this post and which contain greater detail on the issues discussed. The author also expresses his gratitude that these articles have been made available openly online.

Why the weird donation trust beneficiary qualification?

Donation

I was recently asked why a trust deed for a family discretionary trust (FDT) contained this somewhat unusual means of qualifying as a discretionary beneficiary (DB) of the FDT:

any person who makes a donation of (some minimum amount) to …

As the questioner rightly observed, this mechanism readily allows someone outside of a family specified as the DBs, in the main, of a FDT to become a DB. Wouldn’t that mean that a FDT with this mechanism is not or can’t be a family trust?

The answer to this depends on what is meant by family trust.

Certainty of objects necessary for validity of a trust

The thinking behind this kind of provision is that a trust deploying a beneficiary by donation mechanism such as above in its trust deed will be valid.

Certainty of objects is essential for validity of a trust in Australia: Kinsela v. Caldwell (1975) HCA 10. Objects, that is who are or what are to benefit from the trust, being:

  • beneficiaries; or
  • charitable purposes;

must be certain in a valid trust.

It is clear law that a trust (other than a charitable trust) must be for ascertainable beneficiaries.

Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) [1974] Ch 239 at 319 per Lord Denning

When DBs are specifically named or family members qualify by virtue of specified family relationships in a trust deed of a FDT, who qualifies as a beneficiary under the FDT generally presents no uncertainty. It is where classes of beneficiaries are wider and looser that problems of certainty arise and can cause a trust to fail for invalidity. For instance, in R. v District Auditor exparte West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (1986) 1 RVR 24, an English Court found a trust, where the class of beneficiaries was expressed as 2½ million inhabitants of West Yorkshire, was invalid as the class was too large and was thus uncertain.

Donations

It follows that a beneficiary by donation mechanism for DBs in a trust deed of a FDT can readily meet the certainty of objects requirement. A person either has or has not made the requisite donation and so the trustee can perfunctorily ascertain that the person is a DB under the mechanism once the person has made the specified donation. Similarly every person who:

  1. has not made the specified donation;
  2. is not named as a DB; or
  3. is not in any other class of DB;

under the trust deed can be categorised not as a DB of the FDT with certainty.

There are limits to this though.

Or just a gift?

Where the beneficiary by donation mechanism in the trust deed is to a charity then the trustee can observe a donation by the prospective beneficiary. Sometimes I have seen trust deeds where the beneficiary by donation mechanism is a minimum donation not to a charity but to a beneficiary of the trust! A question arises here whether a payment of the minimum amount to qualify as a beneficiary under the mechanism is a donation, or is simply a gift (or perhaps a reimbursement agreement! see below), because the recipient beneficiary is not in need. A donation may need to be both a gift and a gift made to a recipient understood by the donor to be in need based on what a donation is commonly understood to be. Beneficiaries of private trusts in Australia are often well-heeled and are clearly not in need.

It may then follow that the donor does not qualify as a beneficiary of the trust because the donor has not made a donation.

Family trust?

Understanding then that an appropriately constructed beneficiary by donation mechanism for DBs in a FDT, which DBs are not necessarily members of the specified DB family in the trust deed, will not compromise the validity of the FDT as a trust, is it still fair to say that a FDT with this mechanism is still a family trust, that is a trust for a family, in substance?

FDTs as matter of course include charities as objects either so:

  • the trustee with discretion to choose who takes trust property can favour a charity as well as or instead of named beneficiaries and their family members; or
  • FDT income or capital does not become bona vacantia. That is before trust property reverts to the state as ownerless when the trustee doesn’t, can’t or doesn’t wish to exercise its discretion to distribute the property to a DB of the FDT, a charity or often a wide range of charities are able to take trust property under the trust deed of a FDT either by exercise of the trustee’s discretion or on default of that exercise without offending the certainty of objects requirement.

So clearly a FDT can still be a “family trust” in substance even though charities beyond the family can also benefit from the largesse of an FDT.

From that perspective it can be seen that a beneficiary by donation mechanism in the trust deed of a FDT, particularly if it is sparingly used by a trustee of a FDT to benefit non-family beneficiaries, is unlikely to make a FDT any less a family trust.

The point of a donation qualification mechanism in a FDT is to ensure the trust is/remains valid even if a person becomes a beneficiary of the trust using the mechanism who is not within the family or other class of who is a beneficiary in the trust deed. Whether a trust is a family trust or not is not pertinent to that.

Schedule 2F (trust tax losses etc.) family trusts

A “family trust” (2FFT) for the purposes of the (trust loss measures in) Schedule 2F of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 is a different matter. Sections 272-90 and 272-95 of Schedule 2F include certain specified relations of a test individual as members of a family group. Although distributions to individuals outside of the family group are liable to family trust distributions tax (FTDT) under Division 271 of Schedule 2F at the highest marginal income tax rate imposed on the trustee, trust distributions by a 2FFT to those individuals are not precluded by Schedule 2F either by law or in practice.

It can be seen that, unlike with state stamp duty and land tax surcharge measures which impacted who can be a DB of a FDT, the family trust and FTDT regimes in Schedule 2F do not impact on who can be a beneficiary of a FDT. Where a FDT elects to become a 2FFT, no FTDT arises until the 2FFT makes a distribution to an outsider outside of the family group. It matters not under Schedule 2F who qualifies as a DB of a 2FFT but does not receive a distribution.

If Schedule 2F had instead tax penalised 2FFTs with DBs outside of the family group whether or not distributions were made to them we would have seen the range of beneficiaries of FDTs reduce back to family groups and beneficiary by donation mechanisms superseded.

Reimbursement agreements

Another serious fetter on a trustee of a FDT exercising their discretion to distribute trust income to a DB who qualifies as a DB by using a beneficiary by donation mechanism is the high risk and potential that the Commissioner of Taxation may impose section 100A of the ITAA 1936 to tax the distribution on the trustee also at the highest marginal income tax rate.

A discretionary distribution by a trustee of a FDT to a person who is not a member of the family designated for benefit under the FDT begs the question why the distribution is being made outside of the family to this person. It is unusual that a trustee of FDT would seek to benefit someone outside of that family without the family receiving a quid pro quo in some form.

A quid pro quo grounds a reimbursement agreement which triggers section 100A.

A true gift to the non-family DB and the absence of a quid pro quo are facts the trustee and the family would need to prove, to resist a section 100A reimbursement agreement assessment on the trustee of the FDT. Situations where distributions to DBs who are not members of the family are more likely to be accepted by the Commissioner as not involving a reimbursement agreement include where:

  • the DB is a relation of a family member who is narrowly outside the class of family included as beneficiaries under the FDT;
  • the designated family may have few if any surviving family members; or
  • the DB is a person in need;

or a mix of those circumstances and then a beneficiary by donation mechanism in a trust deed of a FDT that is not a 2FFT may be usable without draconian tax consequences.

Graphic designed by Freepik

Controlling who gets death benefits from a SMSF

A widower nominated his son and daughter to take equal shares of his superannuation benefits on his death on a basis not binding on the trustee. The daughter, who was the surviving trustee of her father’s self managed superannuation fund (SMSF) after his death, appointed her husband as the new co-trustee and excluded the son from control of the SMSF. The daughter refused to pay the son the equal share of death benefits based on the father’s non-binding death benefit nomination (DBN). The son unsuccessfully challenged the daughter’s conduct in the NSW Supreme Court: Katz v. Grossman [2005] NSWSC 934.

Dilemma – the SMSF trustee’s control over where death benefits go

Katz v. Grossman reveals a dilemma with SMSFs: whoever survives a member as trustee of a SMSF generally has significant autonomy as to whom death benefits of a deceased member will be paid to by default unless the member:

  • has taken effective steps to ensure the DBN is a valid binding DBN (BDBN) to bind the trustee to pay his or her benefits to:
    • dependant/s nominated by the member; or
    • the member’s estate by nominating the member’s legal personal representative (LPR); or
  • the member has made his or her pension reversionary to their chosen dependant: although a reversionary pensioner generally cannot be an adult child as only death benefits dependants contemplated by section 302-195 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 can receive pension, including reversionary pension, death benefits.

(Exceptions)

The challenge of directing death benefits to dependants

Member control of superannuation is all well and good but selection of dependants to receive death benefits, either by member’s DBN or by the trustee of the fund, is fraught and is just as prone to dispute between disgruntled family beneficiaries as disputes over wills (Wills) and deceased estates are.

With superannuation funds generally, and especially SMSFs, it is a challenge for a member to:

  • maintain an up to date expression of where he or she wants his or her benefits to go on his or her death; and
  • to effect those wishes by way of a DBN.

In many cases this will be inconsequential such as where a surviving spouse of a deceased member is the surviving trustee, or controls the trustee, and is the obvious dependant of the member to take death benefits. But where dependants are next generation, or where a member has a blended family, surviving trustee decisions to pay death benefits of the deceased may not align with the deceased member’s wishes or their DBN especially where trusteeship of the SMSF passes into unexpected and unprofessional trustee hands on their demise.

Section 17A of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (the SIS Act) limits who can be or control a trustee of a SMSF to:

  • the members of the SMSF; or
  • their enduring attorneys;

unless the fund is a single member fund and, in any case, trustees of a SMSF must be unremunerated in their role as trustee: paragraph 17A(2)(c) of the SIS Act. Member controlled superannuation by a SMSF can be a control vacuum isolated from professional trustee expertise following the death of a SMSF member unless a professional is involved in the limited ways possible under sections 17A and 17B.

Does a SMSF member need to control where their death benefits go?

Is it desirable that the member controls where he or she wants his or her benefits to go in any case? Superannuation is explicitly to provide for a member’s dependants when the member dies. The SIS Act defines a dependant:

“dependant”, in relation to a person, includes the spouse of the person, any child of the person and any person with whom the person has an interdependency relationship.

Section 10 of the SIS Act

A deceased member may nominate a dependant by a DBN that is not the dependant of the member most truly dependent or most in need of the member’s death benefits. That is why it is doubly desirable to have a competent and trustworthy person succeed the member as trustee who will genuinely assess these needs. It is on the assumption that such a trustee will survive the member as SMSF trustee that superannuation fund governing rules (SFGRs) generally give the surviving trustee an open discretion to select the dependant of the deceased member to take the member’s benefits unless one of the Exceptions applies.

So even with the guidance of a non-binding DBN (NDBN), which expresses a deceased’s wishes as to whom his or her benefits are to be paid, SFGRs, the SIS Act and trust law typically give a superannuation trustee a power to pay benefits to dependants the trustee chooses in the trustee’s discretion contrary to and despite a NDBN as occurred in Katz v. Grossman.

The binding death benefit nomination

To immunise a DBN from a wrong choice of trustee, who may select a dependant in their discretion at odds with the member’s wishes, a member can use a BDBN. A widow or widower in circumstances similar to Katz v. Grossman can prevent override of their wishes as to who is to be their superannuation dependant to take their death benefits by force of a BDBN to bind the trustee to pay to that dependant.

The BDBN obstacle course

A SMSF member seeking to impose a BDBN to control his or her superannuation needs to be sure it will take effect. There are numerous contingencies. Consider these:

  • is the capability in SFGRs allowing BDBNs effective and does it have integrity? Does the member appreciate that BDBN forms and arrangements differ from trust deed to trust deed? Not all BDBN arrangements in trust deeds are rigorous;
  • will the BDBN be validly completed? (Wareham v. Marsella discussed below is an instance of invalid completion of a BDBN);
  • if the BDBN is stated to be non-lapsing will it take effect as non-lapsing? That is: will the BDBN continue to bind the trustee more than three years after it is made? In the recent case Re SB; Ex parte AC [2020] QSC 139 a non-lapsing BDBN was accepted by the Supreme Court of Queensland. Non-lapsing BDBNs are understood to be feasible for SMSFs following:
    • Donovan v. Donovan [2009] QSC 26; and
    • Self Managed Superannuation Funds Determination SMSFD 2008/3 Self Managed Superannuation Funds: is there any restriction in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) legislation on a self managed superannuation fund trustee accepting from a member a binding nomination of the recipients of any benefits payable in the event of the member’s death?
  • what if the member marries, divorces or commences a reversionary pension after making a BDBN?
  • will the BDBN have a fraud risk? Who needs to witness completion of a BDBN form by a member under the SFGRs? Depending on arrangements and the regime in the SFGRs for safe custody and verification of a BDBN, is there a risk that a BDBN may be altered by a dishonest successor trustee or a trustee in a conflict of interest with other dependants or “lost” so the BDBN won’t take effect as intended by the member? and
  • what if the SFGRs are subsequently amended so that a BDBN made under former SFGRs of a SMSF no longer comply with the later SFGRs?

So a member looking to rely on a BDBN to direct who will take their superannuation faces a veritable obstacle course turning on:

  • the SFGRs in the trust deed of the fund;
  • the member’s domestic circumstances; and
  • the security integrity of the BDBN arrangements;

in his or her quest to have a BDBN complied with by the trustee of the SMSF when the member is no longer around.

Better for a BDBN to be in a member’s Will?

Although a payment of death benefits is not a testamentary disposition:  McFadden v Public Trustee for Victoria [1981] 1 NSWLR 15, it is desirable that a BDBN should be set out in, or, in the least, kept with, the Will of a SMSF member to avoid some of the above contingencies.

Generally speaking Wills are:

  • subject to strict witnessing and other evidentiary requirements under state laws which reduce the prospect of fraud. By inclusion of a BDBN in a Will the BDBN can attract the same protections; and
  • revoked on marriage and, depending on state laws, altered by divorce. A dependant nominated in a BDBN may pre-decease the member. On any of these events BDBNs are ideally revisited and, in that context, a non-lapsing BDBN is especially fraught after a situation where a long-dated BDBN should have been updated to reflect changes in a member’s domestic situation. If a BDBN is in a Will there is a greater likelihood that desirable update of a BDBN will not be overlooked.

There is also the advantage of consolidated consideration and expression of the member’s wishes for his or her property and financial resources substantially in a single document. Superannuation death benefits of deceased superannuation members now frequently exceed deceased estate property governed by their Wills in value.

To include a BDBN in a Will there needs to be a basis or regime for making a BDBN in a member’s Will in the SFGRs (in the trust deed) of a SMSF. Ordinarily SFGRs/SMSF trust deeds do not provide for BDBNs to be set out in a Will and instead require the BDBN to be in a discrete BDBN form.

When there is no BDBN

When:

  1. a BDBN fails;
  2. there is a NDBN but no BDBN; or
  3. no DBN at all;

what assurance does a member have that a trustee will act in the interests of and fairly to the prospective dependants of the member?

There is initially the issue with the first and third cases that there is no satisfactory expression of what the member wishes. This situation arose in the recent Victorian Supreme Court Appeal decision in Wareham v. Marsella [2020] VSCA 92.

Wareham v. Marsella

In Wareham v. Marsella the dependants of the deceased member of a SMSF included:

  1. the deceased’s daughter from her earlier marriage, Mrs. Wareham; and
  2. her husband of 32 years up to her death, Mr Marsella.

The deceased had made a BDBN in favour of her grandchildren at the inception of the SMSF but her grandchildren were not her superannuation dependants (see the definition in section 10 of the SIS Act above) so the BDBN was invalid.

Mrs. Wareham was the deceased member’s surviving trustee. Relations between her and the husband, Mr. Marsella, were strained. Mrs. Wareham appointed her husband Mr. Wareham as co-trustee. The trustees paid all of the deceased’s SMSF death benefits to Mrs. Wareham wholly excluding Mr. Marsella.

At first instance McMillan J. held that Mr and Mrs Wareham had exercised their discretion as trustees without giving real and genuine consideration to the interests of the dependants of the SMSF and:

  • set aside the exercise of their trustees’ discretion to favour themselves; and
  • removed Mr and Mrs Wareham as trustees of the SMSF.

This result was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The court confirmed the wide autonomy the trustees of the SMSF had to select a dependant to take death benefits:

Apart from cases where trustees disclose their reasons, the exercise of an absolute and unfettered discretion is examinable only as to good faith, real and genuine consideration and absence of ulterior purpose, and not as to the method and manner of its exercise.

from Karger v Paul [1984] VicRP 13

Mr and Mrs Wareham did not give reasons for their decision to distribute all of the death benefits to Mrs. Wareham which meant that Mr. Marsella needed to establish:

  • bad faith;
  • lack of real and genuine consideration by; and/or
  • an ulterior purpose of

the trustees in making the decision (the Challengeable Grounds).  These are all matters that are challenging to prove before a court particularly where there are no expressed reasons of the trustees for making the decision. However in this exceptional case the Supreme Court could focus on:

  • the erroneous response by the trustees’ lawyers in correspondence with Mr. Marsella over his claim to participate as a dependant. From that it could be shown that the trustees misconceived their obligation to give Mr. Marsella’s claim a real and genuine consideration. For instance, the trustees’ lawyers had asserted in the correspondence that “Mr. Marsella was not a beneficiary or dependant and had no interest in the fund”; and
  • the bad faith of the trustees. The court observed that “the decision to pay no part of the death benefit to the deceased’s husband of more than 30 years was, at least, remarkable” and the “grotesquely unreasonable” nature of the decision to exclude him was enough to establish bad faith. As there was actual conflict between Mrs. Wareham, a trustee, and Mr. Marsella the court observed that it may remove a trustee in its discretion.

Balanced against that was:

  • the trustees’ resolution to pay Mrs. Wareham which did not reveal errors that establish any of Challengeable Grounds;
  • the power of the trustees to pay death benefits to a dependant who is a trustee despite the conflict of interest; and
  • the trustees did not give evidence and so where not examined about their consideration of Mr. Marsella’s claims as a dependant;

An exceptional case

So even though Mr. Marsella was successful the case was appealed and hard fought. The trustees’ lawyer’s unlikely lapses in the correspondence and the extreme outcome and treatment of a husband of more than 30 years were vital to the result especially where SFGRs expressly permit a trustee to favour themselves in death benefits discretionary decisions despite their conflict of interest with other potential dependants that could receive those death benefits.

Where a trustee is more cautious and opaque in the course of:

  • their decision to pay death benefits to their own benefit, despite their conflict of interest; and
  • in related correspondence;

the trustee will reveal little which will give a disgruntled dependant Challengeable Grounds to challenge the trustee’s exercise of discretion.

In that respect Katz v. Grossman more likely reflects the reality facing most disgruntled family members who miss out on death benefits, especially those who are not a spouse or in an interdependency relationship. In Katz v. Grossman Mr. Katz may not have been in a position to establish the Challengeable Grounds even though:

  • his father had nominated him on a non-binding basis to take an equal share of his death benefits; and
  • his sister and her husband as trustees of the SMSF instead distributed all of the death benefits of the father to his sister.

Conclusion

It follows that the authority of Wareham v. Marsella may only assist a spouse or interdependency dependant highly deserving of death benefits as dependants in compelling cases where:

  • a SMSF’s trustee makes identifiable error in the process of discretionary decision-making to pay death benefits to himself or herself despite their conflict of interest with the deceased’s spouse or interdependency dependant; and
  • where that spouse or interdependency dependant can endure legal action to challenge the decision based on the Challengeable Grounds.

Otherwise SMSF members need to ensure the right person or people are their successor trustee of their SMSF if a Katz v. Grossman or other situation where a dependant favoured by the member misses out on death benefits is to be avoided. A valid or current expression of wishes either in a NDBN or better:

  • in a BDBN, rigorously backed by SFGRs, included in or with the Will of the member to ensure its integrity, reducing the likelihood that a payment of death benefits will be made to the exclusion of a desired or deserving family member especially where, due to the confines of the SIS Act, the member can’t be confident that their successor SMSF trustee won’t use the opportunity to favour their own benefit; or
  • where a member foresees that their dependants will be in potential conflict, in next generation or blended family circumstances, by taking steps in accordance with the SFGRs to remove trustee autonomy to make the death benefits payment decision and to instead mandate that death benefits are to be paid to the LPR of the member in compliance with core purposes of superannuation which allow payment of death benefits to the LPR under section 62 of the SIS Act. In that case the member can set out how death benefits are to be left in his or her Will.

The AAT applies Bamford to rubbery number trust income distributions in Donkin – or does it?

RubberyNumbers

In Donkin & Others v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2019] AATA 6746, a recently published decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), the AAT considered how section 97 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1936 applied to distributions by the trustee of a family discretionary trust (FDT).

Distributions of income were made to up to five beneficiaries (the Participating Beneficiaries) by resolution of the trustee of the Joshline Family Trust (the JFT), a FDT, for the 2010 to 2013 income years (the Years).

Tax audit – taxable income of the JFT increased

Following an audit of the first Participating Beneficiary, Mr Donkin, and his associated entities the Commissioner of Taxation (Commissioner):

  • disallowed deductions to the JFT increasing the taxable income of the JFT for the Years; and so
  • increased the taxable income of the JFT.

Before the AAT the Participating Beneficiaries contended that:

  • on the increase in the taxable income of the JFT the respective shares of taxable income of the Participating Beneficiaries should remain constant (unaltered); with
  • the increase in JFT taxable income taxable to (another) residuary beneficiary Joshline (understood to be a company taxable at no more than 30%).

The Commissioner contended that, based on the High Court authority in Commissioner of Taxation v. Bamford [2010] HCA 10 (Bamford), the proportionate approach should be applied to proportionately increase the taxable income of the Participating Beneficiaries under section 97 from their shares of taxable income on which they were originally assessed.

AAT decides – aligns with Commissioner

The AAT accepted the Commissioner’s contentions and increased the taxable income of:

  • the Participating Beneficiaries where section 97 applied; and
  • the trustee in respect of Participating Beneficiaries where section 98 applied.

The residuary beneficiary Joshline was not assessed to any of the increase.

Opaque expression of distributable income

The resolutions of the JFT during the Years were odd in that they expressed or specified distributions as amounts of assessable income to which (“trust law”) income (unspecified) was to equate to. The trust deed of the JFT supported this novel approach which was directed to tax planning and, in particular, to certainty of assessable income that each Participating Beneficiary would receive.

These resolutions did not specify distributable income and so obliged a backwards calculation from shares of “assessable income” of the JFT to ascertain the distributable income and the share of it each Participating Beneficiary was entitled to.

How distributable income can be distributed

“Trust law” income, referred to in the legislation as “a share of the income of the trust estate”, considered by the High Court in Bamford to be “distributable income” is, and was described in Bamford as:

income ascertained by the trustee according to appropriate accounting principles and the trust instrument

Bamford at paragraph 45

which can be distributed and which the trustee distributes to beneficiaries and by which the respective shares of assessable income of beneficiaries, and trustees on behalf of other beneficiaries of a trust, is determined under sections 97 and 98 respectively.

If, on a 30 June at the end of an income year (30 June), the trustee has a specified a prescription for the distribution of income of a FDT whether it be:

  • an amount (from);
  • a set proportion, say expressed in percentage terms; or
  • a residue or remaining amount;

of distributable income then that can be accepted understanding that, almost universally, the trustee will not have had the opportunity, by 30 June, to ascertain the distributable income of the FDT to a final figure or amount.

Timing of present entitlement to distributable income

Nevertheless:

  • distributions are FDT trustee decisions that need to be made by 30 June if the distributions are to confer present entitlement on beneficiaries in the year of income; and
  • beneficiaries must be presently entitled to a share of the distributable income for either of section 97 or section 98 to apply.

Section 99A will apply to a FDT to tax the income to which no beneficiary is presently entitled by 30 June to the trustee at the highest marginal income tax rate. See my post (My Lewski Post) about Lewski v. Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCAFC 145 where that happened. Lewski was referred to by the AAT in Donkin: Full Federal Court pinpoints year end trust resolutions that fail https://wp.me/p6T4vg-8s

Setting distributable income by 30 June

It follows that to effectively confer present entitlement a trustee decision to distribute trust income under a discretion needs to determine the share of distributable income of each beneficiary by 30 June. That determination of the trustee is confirmed and applied when the trustee prepares accounts for trust purposes in accordance with the terms of the trust deed and, if beneficiaries are entitled to a proportion or a residue of distributable income rather than a fixed amount of distributable income, those entitlements can then be ascertained from distributable income or the remaining distributable income numerically.

Distributable income not set in Donkin

However, in Donkin, the Participating Beneficiaries had entitlements to a proportion of “assessable income” (viz. taxable income or “net income” for the purposes of sub-section 95(1) of the ITAA 1936) (Taxable Income).  For instance, under the resolutions Mr. Donkin was entitled to 70.11% of the Taxable Income, not distributable income, of the JFT for the 2013 income year. So in the Commissioner’s contention, as accepted by the AAT, Mr. Donkin was taxable under section 97 on:

  • $262,659 being 70.11% of the Taxable Income of the JFT for the 2013 year when an original assessment was raised on Mr. Donkin’s share of trust Taxable Income returned by the trustee of the trust; and then
  • $304,137 being 70.11% of the Taxable Income of the JFT for the 2013 year following the amendment of the assessments following the audit.

It can be inferred from and is consistent with the Commissioner’s contention that, on the amendment of Mr Donkin’s 2013 assessment in or around 2015, the distributable income of Mr. Donkin was increased at that later time – the proportion of Taxable Income, 70.11%, did not change.

But how can distributable income of a trust increase after 30 June income year end?

Understanding that the trustee of the JFT determined the distributable income of the JFT and Mr. Donkin’s share of it by 30 June 2013 by mechanisms in the trust deed fixing and thus making Mr. Donkin presently entitled to a share of income confirmable and confirmed when 2013 accounts of the JFT were taken, how can a 2015 amendment to Taxable Income of the JFT alter the 2013 distributable income of the JFT and the present entitlement of Mr. Donkin to it at 30 June 2013?

It seems to me that the AAT has set out good reasons why the Commissioner’s contentions to:

  • alter distributable income; and
  • increase the present entitlement of each Participating Beneficiary supposedly by the end of the relevant June 30;

should not have been accepted and there should have been no change in distributable income of the Participating Beneficiaries in the Years. In paragraphs 42 and 43 of the AAT’s decision, in a response to different propositions put by the Applicants, the AAT stated:

42. It seems to us that on the Applicants’ construction of the resolutions their alternative submission would be correct. That is to say, the resolutions would be ineffective to confer a present entitlement on the individual beneficiaries because they involved a contingency.

43. They would depend on the occurrence of an event which may or may not happen, in particular, the Respondent disallowing a deduction and including an additional amount in assessable income. It follows that the individual beneficiaries would not be “presently entitled” under ss 97 or 98 of the ITAA36 to a share of the income of the JFT.

Donkin & Others v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2019] AATA 6746 paragraphs 42-43

These findings do resonate against the Commissioner’s and the AAT’s construction of the resolutions and the trust deed too.

Construing trust income resolutions applying Bamford

The High Court in Bamford stated:

The opening words of s 97(1) speak of “a beneficiary of a trust estate” who is “presently entitled to a share of the income of the trust estate”. The language of present entitlement is that of the general law of trusts, but adapted to the operation of the 1936 Act upon distinct years of income. The effect of the authorities dealing with the phrase “presently entitled” was considered in Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation where it was accepted that a beneficiary would be so entitled if, and only if,

“(a) the beneficiary has an interest in the income which is both vested in interest and vested in possession; and (b) the beneficiary has a present legal right to demand and receive payment of the income, whether or not the precise entitlement can be ascertained before the end of the relevant year of income and whether or not the trustee has the funds available for immediate payment.”

Bamford at paragraph 37

So in whatever way the trust deed of the trust allows the trustee to ascertain distributable income, the trustee must identify distributable income, or use a method which enables identification of distributable income not subject to contingency, by 30 June to confer present entitlement by 30 June. Without that a beneficiary has no present legal right to demand and receive payment of their share of income by 30 June.

It is that identification of distributable income referred to in Zeta Force Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation  (1998) 84 FCR 70 at 74‑75 to which the High Court in Bamford refers where the High Court cites Sundberg J. with approval:

The words ‘income of the trust estate’ in the opening part of s 97(1) refer to distributable income, that is to say income ascertained by the trustee according to appropriate accounting principles and the trust instrument. That the words have this meaning is confirmed by the use elsewhere in Div 6 of the contrasting expression ‘net income of the trust estate’. The beneficiary’s ‘share’ is his share of the distributable income.”

….

“Having identified the share of the distributable income to which the beneficiary is presently entitled, s 97(1) requires one to ascertain ‘that share of the net income of the trust estate’. That share is included in the beneficiary’s assessable income.”

….

from Bamford at paragraph 45

It is respectfully suggested that the later part of Sundberg J.’s findings cited by the High Court:

Once the share of the distributable income to which the beneficiary is presently entitled is worked out, the notion of present entitlement has served its purpose, and the beneficiary is to be taxed on that share (or proportion) of the taxable ncome of the trust estate.

from Bamford at paragraph 45

does not mean that the distributable income of a FDT is to be or can be derived from Taxable Income of the FDT unless that proportion must be quantified or quantifiable, maybe by backwards calculation, by 30 June. For instance, the trustee’s own estimate of Taxable Income on or before 30 June, which could be supported by evidence after the fact, could be a parameter of distributable income which must be fixed if not ascertained by 30 June to achieve present entitlement.

Distributable income at 30 June is then routinely reflected in the accounts of a FDT at 30 June and other evidence which later demonstates what the trustee fixed as distributable income at 30 June.

Why was there no distributable income calculation for each 30 June in Donkin?

The Commissioner too could have worked out the amount of, or the figure for, distributable income of the JFT consistent with resolutions and accounts for the Years and other evidence. including trust tax returns, prepared and lodged later. It is implausible that the trustee of the JFT took into account the 2015 inclusions in Taxable Income in its 2010 to 2013 decisions which the AAT correctly observed was a contingency at the each of the 30 Junes through the Years.

Section 99A should have applied

In my understanding:

  • the Participating Beneficiaries in Donkin were not presently entitled in the Years to a proportion of amounts first included in Taxable Income in around 2015 following the Commissioner’s audit and amendment of assessments: and
  • section 99A should thus have been applied to these proportions when they became Taxable Income in 2015.

Distributable income – no place for a variable parameter

The AAT appears to have accepted that distributable income can be a variable parameter which can fluctuate after 30 June; the Commissioner and the AAT accepted a distribution method in Donkin based on a set proportion of Taxable Income, a variable parameter, which, in their view, caused distributable income to vary after 30 June when assessments were varied following audit. This sanctioned the use of rubbery numbers for ascertaining shares of distributable income, which the trust deed of the JFT contemplated for opaque tax reasons, without applying section 99A which, in my understanding and based on this analysis, should have applied.

That is disappointing, especially on the urging of the Commissioner, as the AAT decisions may influence future practice and encourage rubbery distributions of distributable income and the use of contorted trust deed provisions that facilitate them.

Income equalisation clauses

Family discretionary trust deeds I have prepared for over thirty years, and deeds drawn by many other preparers, have long based distributions of distributable income on an income equalisation clause. I suggest that an income equalisation clause is, and has always been, a more conventional mechanism for practically dealing with the divergence between distributable income and Taxable Income in section 97 of the ITAA 1936 than the mechanisms contained in the trust deed of the JFT.

An income equalisation clause is a provision in a FDT trust deed which allows the trustee to align the distributable income of a FDT to Taxable Income.

The above analysis is also relevant to how an income equalisation clause using Taxable Income, a parameter that can change after a 30 June year end, should be construed. I addressed this question in My Lewski Post. There I concluded, based on the Full Federal Court’s views of how trust deeds and resolutions are to be construed, that Taxable Income in an income equalisation clause should be construed as Taxable Income based on knowledge of the trustee, informing the trustee’s decision at the time of the distribution, which is confirmed when accounts of the FDT for the relevant income year are taken and the mechanisms from the trust deed for determining distributable income are applied. On that construction Taxable Income is or should be fixed and present entitlement of beneficiaries to shares of distributable income of a FDT at 30 June can thus be attained.

Changing the trustee of a trust – some elements for success

It is sometimes wrongly assumed that a minute of the current trustee is sufficient to change the trustee of:

  • a family discretionary trust (FDT); or
  • a self managed superannuation fund (SMSF) (which must be a trust with a trustee too – see sub-section 19(2) of the Superannuation Industry (Superannuation) Act (C’th) 1993 (SIS Act));

and that a change of trustee will have no serious tax consequences. The second proposition is more likely to be true, but not always.

FDTs and SMSFs invariably commence with a deed which contains the terms (the trust terms or governing rules – TTOGRs) on which the trust commences. That, in itself, is a reason why I contended in 2009 in Redoing the deed that an instrument or resolution less than a deed to change the trustee is prone to be ineffective even where change by less than or other than a deed is stated to be permitted by the TTOGRs in the trust deed.

Changing trustee relying on ability to change in the trust deed

It is thus to the trust deed that one needs to look to find:

  1. whether there is a power in the TTOGRs to appoint a new trustee or to otherwise change the trustee; and
  2. if, so, what the procedure or formalities are for doing so.

Changing trustee relying on the Trustee Acts

If ability to change trustee is not present, or is derelict, in the TTOGRs then the Trustee Acts in states (and territories) provide options for appointing a new or additional trustee which vary state to state.

Trustee Act – New South Wales

In New South Wales: section 6 of the Trustee Act (NSW) 1925 allows a person nominated for the purpose of appointing trustees in the TTOGRs, a surviving trustee or a continuing trustee to appoint a new trustee in certain specified situations such as where a trustee:

  • has died;
  • is incapable of acting as trustee; or
  • is absent for a specified period out of the state.

However an appointment of a new trustee in these situations must be effected by registered deed: sub-section 6(1) That is the deed of appointment must be registered with the general registry kept by the NSW Registrar-General, which is publicly searchable, and the applicable fee to so register the deed must be paid to NSW Land Registry Services for the appointment to take effect.

It is apparent from sub-section 6(13) that registration of a deed of appointment is not required where ability to appoint a new trustee is in the TTOGRs where the TTOGRs express a contrary intention; that is: where the TTOGRs expressly and effectively allow an appointment to be effected without a registered deed.

Trustee Act – Victoria

In Victoria there is a comparable capability for a person nominated for the purpose of appointing trustees in the TTOGRs, a surviving trustee or a continuing trustee to appoint a new trustee in writing in certain specified situations such as where a trustee:

  • has died;
  • is incapable of acting as trustee; or
  • is absent for a specified period out of the state;

under section 41 of the Trustee Act (Vic.) 1958. However this Victorian law does not impose any requirement that the required instrument of appointment in writing must be registered.

Changing trustee by obtaining a court order

The supreme courts of the states and territories are also given a residual statutory capability to appoint trustees under the respective Trustee Acts. However applying to a supreme court for an order to change a trustee of a FDT or a SMSF with sufficient supporting grounds is an option of last resort given likely significant costs and uncertainties of obtaining the order.

Changing trustee by deed

The TTOGRs in a trust deed of a FDT or a SMSF will frequently require that an appointment of a new trustee may or must be effected by a deed. It is desirable that it should do so to ensure the appointment of a new trustee does not become of a matter of uncertainty and difficulty for the reasons I have described in Redoing the deed.

Tax consequences of a change of trustee

As a change of trustee without more generally does not change beneficial entitlements under a trust, the tax consequences are usually benign:

For capital gains tax (CGT), assurance that changing trustee does not give rise to a CGT event for all of the CGT assets held in a trust is diffuse under the Income Tax Assessment Act (C’th) (ITAA) 1997:

Sub-section 104-10(2) concerning CGT event A1 states:

(2) You dispose of a * CGT asset if a change of ownership occurs from you to another entity, whether because of some act or event or by operation of law. However, a change of ownership does not occur if you stop being the legal owner of the asset but continue to be its beneficial owner.

Note: A change in the trustee of a trust does not constitute a change in the entity that is the trustee of the trust (see subsection 960-100(2)). This means that CGT event A1 will not happen merely because of a change in the trustee.

Sub-section 960-100(2) with the Notes below it in fact say:

(2) The trustee of a trust, of a superannuation fund or of an approved deposit fund is taken to be an entity consisting of the person who is the trustee, or the persons who are the trustees, at any given time.

Note 1: This is because a right or obligation cannot be conferred or imposed on an entity that is not a legal person.

Note 2: The entity that is the trustee of a trust or fund does not change merely because of a change in the person who is the trustee of the trust or fund, or persons who are the trustees of the trust or fund.

Similarly sections 104-55 and 104-60 of the ITAA 1997 which concern:

• Creating a trust over a CGT asset: CGT event E1

• Transferring a CGT asset to a trust: CGT event E2

each restate the above Note: viz.

Note: A change in the trustee of a trust does not constitute a change in the entity that is the trustee of the trust (see subsection 960-100(2)). This means that CGT event E… will not happen merely because of a change in the trustee.

Stamp duty

A change of trustee can have stamp duty consequences where the trust holds dutiable property such as real estate.

Duty – NSW

Concessional stamp duty on the transfer of the dutiable property of the trust to the new trustee can be denied in NSW to a FDT unless the trust deed of the trust limits who can be a beneficiary, for anti-avoidance reasons: see sub-section 54(3) of the Duties Act (NSW) 1997.

Indeed Revenue NSW withholds the requisite satisfaction in sub-section 54(3) unless the TTOGRs provide or have been varied in such a way so that an appointed new trustee or a continuing trustee irrevocably cannot participate as a beneficiary of the trust. Contentiously satisfaction is withheld by Revenue NSW unless a variation to a FDT to so limit the beneficiaries is “irrevocable“ : see paragraph 6 of Revenue Ruling DUT 037, even though that variation may not be plausible or permissible under the TTOGRs of the FDT.

This hard line is taken by Revenue NSW to defeat schemes where someone, who might otherwise be a purchaser of dutiable property who would pay full duty on purchase of the property from the trust, becomes both a trustee and beneficiary able to control and beneficially own the property who is thus able to contrive liability only for concessional duty and avoid full duty,

Duty – Victoria

Although the Duties Act (Vic.) 2000 contains anti-avoidance provisions addressed at this kind of anti-avoidance arrangement, there is no comparable hard line to that in NSW in sub-section 33(3) of the Duties Act (Vic.) 2000 so that the transfer of dutiable property, including real estate, on changing trustee is more readily exempt from stamp duty.

Other requirements

A prominent requirement on changing trustee of a SMSF is notification to the Australian Taxation Office, as the regulator of SMSFs, within twenty-eight days of the change: see Changes to your SMSF at the ATO website.

Where changing trustee involves a corporate trustee then there may also be an obligation to inform the Australian Securities and Investments Commission of changes to details of directors of the corporate trustee, if any. There may be further matters to be addressed if any new or continuing directors are or will become non-residents of Australia and, with SMSFs, the general requirement in section 17A of the SIS Act that the parity between members of the fund on the one hand and trustees, or directors of the corporate trustee on the other, needs to borne in mind and, if need be, addressed.

Full Federal Court pinpoints year end trust resolutions that fail

failContractual principles apply to construe trust resolutions

The Full Court of the Federal Court in Lewski v. Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCAFC 145 has given us a roadmap to construing trust resolutions in line with principles for the construction of contracts, from Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26, and has applied two of those principles of contractual construction to pinpoint invalid trust resolutions as follows:

  • an invalid trust resolution can be severed from another valid resolution or resolutions so that those resolutions can stand, but only if those resolutions are not interdependent with the invalid resolution and it is not artificial for them to stand severed from the invalid resolution; and
  • if there are two open constructions of a trust resolution, one of which results in validity and one of which results in invalidity, the construction that preserves validity is to be preferred.

Trust resolutions to confer a present entitlement to discretionary trust income

An Australian tax resident beneficiary must be presently entitled to the income of a discretionary trust in the income year in which income has earned by the trust before the relevant share of that income can be included in the assessable income of the beneficiary: sub-section 97(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1936. If it cannot be shown that:

"the beneficiary has an interest in the income which is both vested in interest and vested in possession; and (b) the beneficiary has a present legal right to demand and receive payment of the income, whether or not the precise entitlement can be ascertained before the end of the relevant year of income and whether or not the trustee has the funds available for immediate payment."  

High Court in Harmer v. Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264 at p. 271

then the beneficiary is not presently entitled to the relevant share of income with section 99A of the ITAA 1936 applying to tax the trustee on the income to which no beneficiary is presently entitled at the highest individual marginal income tax rate.

Ownership and present right to demand payment

“Vested in interest” and “vested in possession” are technical concepts which broadly equate to ownership, and the extent of ownership required for present entitlement is ownership of the share of income sufficient to bestow a present legal right to demand payment of the income. The legal right to demand and receive payment of an ascertainable entitlement to a share of income must be present and fully defined in the income year even if the entitlement cannot be numerically ascertained due to accounts not having been taken by the end of the relevant income year. In a discretionary trust the trustee is generally reliant on a valid year end trust resolution to distribute income of the trust to confer a sufficient present entitlement to the income of a discretionary trust on a beneficiary so that section 99A will not be attracted.

After Bamford

We have known, especially since 2011, when the Commissioner of Taxation came to take a harder and more sophisticated line on year end trust resolutions following the High Court decision in Commissioner of Taxation v Bamford [2010] HCA 10 and the Tax Laws Amendment (2011 Measures No. 5) Act 2011 introduced in response to the Bamford decision; that the form of the year end trust income distribution resolution is vital to the taxation of discretionary distributions to beneficiaries.

Construing the Lewski trust resolutions

In Lewski discretionary trust resolutions to distribute income were stress tested for present entitlement, meaning and validity to determine where liabilities to tax lay.

The Commissioner, in amended assessments issued to Ms. Lewski, and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) at first instance, disallowed carry forward tax losses to discretionary trusts and assessed trust income of $10,108,621 and $3,143,199 to Ms. Lewski as a presently entitled beneficiary of each trust under sub-section 97(1). Ms. Lewski sought to reduce or deflect the tax liability on this income by claiming that, alternatively:

  • the carry forward trust losses should have been allowed as deductible to the trusts;
  • her entitlements to the income of the trusts had been disclaimed;
  • the trust distributions were ineffective as they were made in a manner beyond the power of the trustees; and
  • Ms. Lewski was not presently entitled to the trust distributions;

which the Commissioner disputed.

The strategy of Ms. Lewski was to reduce the liability to tax or to deflect liability to tax under the amended assessments elsewhere, whether to the trustees of the trusts on income to which no beneficiary was presently entitled under section 99A or to default beneficiaries of the trusts, companies ACUPL and AISPL respectively (abbreviated), claimed to be entitled to the adjusted income of the trusts under the amended assessments instead of Ms. Lewski. It is supposed that, in both income years, less tax was recoverable by the Commissioner in those cases than if Ms. Lewski was presently entitled as a beneficiary of the trusts to the adjusted income.

Ms. Lewski wins

Before the Full Court of the Federal Court Ms. Lewski successfully challenged the disallowance of the tax losses and thus won her appeal against the imposition of the tax liabilities.

Resolutions under scrutiny

The applicable year end trust resolution documents distributed the income of the trusts:

2006 year:

100% to Ms. Lewski

2007 year:

the first $3.5 million to AISPL and the balance to Ms. Lewski.

In each resolution document, there was also a ‘variation of income’ resolution to the effect that, should the Commissioner disallow any amount claimed as a deduction or include any amount of the deduction in the assessable income of the trust, there would be a “deemed” distribution to the default beneficiaries (in the 2006 year, 100% to ACUPL; in the 2007 year, 100% to AISPL).

The “variation of income” resolutions made the 2006 year and 2007 year distributions contingent on events that could occur after the end of those years of income respectively. The Commissioner contended that the variation of income resolutions, which were of doubtful validity, could be severed from the valid resolutions in the resolution documents distributing the income of the trusts. Applying the principles and authorities relating to the severance of provisions in contracts the court did not accept this approach. The distribution resolutions and the variation of income resolutions where found to be interdependent and so the variation of income resolutions could not be “severed” from the distribution resolutions with the effect that either:

  • each purported income distribution was subject to a live contingency in the variation of income resolutions after the end of the applicable income year – the court’s preferred view; or
  • the distributions failed as the interdependent variation of income resolution was invalid in each case – the court’s alternative view;

defeating the present entitlement of Ms. Lewski to the income of the trusts at the end of the year of income of each trust in either case.

The trust deeds of each of the trusts contained notably complicated clauses for the ascertainment and distribution of the income of the trusts. Ms. Lewski contended that the distribution of “income” in the trust resolutions, rather than “net income”, was beyond the power of the trustees and so failed as resolutions beyond the power of the trustees given in the trust deeds. The court rejected this contention after applying the contractual principle that where there are two open constructions of a provision, the construction of the provision that preserves validity is to be preferred. From that perspective “income” in the trust resolutions could be treated as meaning “net income”.

Construing income equalisation clauses

Two aspects of the Full Federal Court decision in Lewski are useful in construing income equalisation clauses in discretionary trust deeds.

Generally an income equalisation clause sets the net income of the trust to which sub-section 97(1) applies, being “trust income” or “distributable income” identified in Bamford, equal to the net income of the trust under section 95 of the ITAA 1936. Understanding that the Commissioner can amend the net income of the trust under section 95 by an amended assessment well after the end of the income year, can this contingency affect the “trust income” or “distributable income” by which the shares and proportions of income distributed to beneficiaries are ascertained?

The preferred construction, if available, of an income equalisation clause is that “trust income” is set to the net income of the trust under section 95 of the ITAA 1936 based on understandings that are ascertainable at the end of the year of income when the income distribution is made. In other words the taxable income of the trust that is ascertainable. That follows from Lewski where the court found, in the context of distributions asserted by Ms. Lewski to be beyond the power of the trustees, that where there are two open constructions of a trust distribution resolution, the construction which results in validity is to be preferred to the construction which results in invalidity.

“Trust income” needs to be closed at year end

To sustain a valid construction an income equalisation, effectuated by an income equalisation clause in a discretionary trust deed, needs to be a closed parameter at the end of a year of income. If the parameter is open, that is, if “trust income” or “distributable income” identified in Bamford is not fully ascertainable by the end of the applicable income year using the income equalisation mechanism in a trust deed, then a distribution based on trust income reliant on that mechanism will not confer a present entitlement and section 99A can apply to the income purportedly distributed as income to which no beneficiary is presently entitled.