Tag Archives: Tax deductions

Perils travelling to your SMSF’s overseas residential property investment

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Will a self managed superannuation fund (SMSF) investment in an overseas apartment or investment property open up assisted overseas travel opportunities for the members of the SMSF? Can or should the SMSF reimburse the members who travel to an overseas residential property (ORP) to improve, maintain or to get the ORP ready for letting, for their travel costs? Are the travel expenses deductible to the SMSF or to SMSF members who incur them?

Deductions

These expenses are not deductible to a SMSF member as they are not incurred in earning assessable income of a SMSF member. Rental income earned by a SMSF is not income of a SMSF member. It follows only the SMSF earning the rental income is placed to deduct its expenditure on earning its assessable income under section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1997 (see the Kei example given by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) at Rental properties and travel expenses | Australian Taxation Office https://is.gd/mucEvN ) while the SMSF is in accumulation phase.

Limits on travel expenses to income earning residential properties

Since 2017 travel expense deductions, that might have been deductible under section 8-1 before then, have been restricted by section 26-31 of the ITAA 1997 which provides:

Travel related to use of residential premises as residential accommodation
(1) You cannot deduct under this Act a loss or outgoing you incur, insofar as it is related to travel, if:
(a) it is incurred in gaining or producing your assessable income from the use of residential premises as residential accommodation; and
(b) it is not necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing your assessable income.
Exception–kind of entity
(2) Subsection (1) does not stop you deducting a loss or outgoing if, at any time during the income year in which the loss or outgoing is incurred, you are:
(a) a corporate tax entity; or
(b) a superannuation plan that is not a self managed superannuation fund; or
(c) a managed investment trust; or
(d) a public unit trust (within the meaning of section 102P of the ITAA 1936); or
(e) a unit trust or partnership, if each member of the trust or partnership is covered by a paragraph of this subsection at that time during the income year.

section 26-31 of the ITAA 1997

SMSFs earning residential rents are more likely to be, and be treated as, investors and not business operators and in those cases the SMSF won’t carry on a business that satisfies the negative limb of paragraph 26-31(1)(b) meaning travel expense deductions will indeed be constrained by section 26-31.

and see:
Rental properties and travel expenses | Australian Taxation Office https://is.gd/mucEvN

How about the SMSF earning residential rental income through a business?

Generally SMSFs are poorly placed to carry on a business of earning rents from its residential properties:

  1. for regulatory reasons: see: Carrying on a business in an SMSF | Australian Taxation Office https://is.gd/ildkCR; and
  2. for structural reasons including scale and other reasons considered in:
    1. Taxation Determination TD 2011/21 Income tax: does it follow merely from the fact that an investment has been made by a trustee that any gain or loss from the investment will be on capital account for tax purposes?;
    2. Commissioner of Taxation v. Radnor [1991] FCA 499; and
    3. section 295-85 of the ITAA 1997 under which capital gains tax, as it applies to investors, is specified as the primary income tax code applicable to complying superannuation funds (CSFs).

How about the SMSF earning income from use of the ORP as an airbnb or similar?

Under the goods and services tax rules residential premises, rents from which are input taxed, are distinguished from commercial residential premises such as motels and the like where tariffs are for taxable supplies of accommodation. But even if the ORP of a SMSF is commercial residential premises for GST purposes this does not mean they are not residential premises for the purposes of section 26-31.

The A New Tax System (Goods And Services Tax) Act 1999 provides:

Residential rent

 (1) A supply of premises that is by way of lease, hire or licence (including a renewal or extension of a lease, hire or licence) is input taxed if:

  (a) the supply is of residential premises (other than a supply of commercial residential premises  or a supply of accommodation in  commercial residential premises provided to an individual by the entity that owns or controls the  commercial residential premises ); or

  (b) the supply is of commercial accommodation and Division 87 (which is about long-term accommodation in commercial premises) would apply to the supply but …

sub-section 40-35(1) of the A New Tax System (Goods And Services Tax) Act 1999

which shows that, even for GST purposes, commercial residential premises is not a carve out from residential premises as such but the GST legislation differentiates only for specific purposes, viz. those in section 40-35, where supplies of residential premises that are not commercial residential premises are input taxed.

So an ORP used as an airbnb or similar can still be residential premises for the purposes of paragraph 26-31(1)(b) even though they may be commercial residential premises to which paragraph 40-35(1)(a) of the A New Tax System (Goods And Services Tax) Act 1999 may apply.

Can the SMSF meet the travel expenses in any case even when they are non-deductible for income tax?

A trustee of a SMSF may consider:

  • paying the cost of the flight directly; or
  • reimbursing the director/s but on a non-deductible basis.

But these concerns with the SMSF meeting the travel costs also need to be considered:

  • the expense may not be incurred on an arm’s length basis as required under section 109 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) [SIS] Act 1993;
  • the expense and other circumstances of the investment in ORP may indicate that the investment in ORP is not being maintained for the purposes listed under section 62 of the SIS Act; or
  • the expense may be a non arm’s length expense (NALE) viz. a loss, outgoing or expenditure caught by the non arm’s length income (NALI) rules in section 295-550 of the ITAA 1997 applicable to complying superannuation entities including SMSFs either in accumulation phase or pension phase.

Following the Treasury Laws Amendment (Support for Small Business and Charities and Other Measures) Act 2024 a NALE is taxed to the SMSF at the highest marginal rate based on twice the difference between the NALE incurred and what would have been incurred had the SMSF met the NALE on an arm’s length rate: see new sub-section 295-550(8) of the SIS Act. The first two infractions  viz. the arm’s length requirement in section 109 and the sole purpose test in section 62, have potentially wider and more serious ramifications.

Actions the ATO can take against trustees of SMSFs

Section 62 should only apply where a SMSF acquires and holds ORP seemingly as a lifestyle choice, that is for the use or enjoyment of members rather than to provide for the retirement, permanent incapacity or for dependents on death of members being the sole purposes for which regulated superannuation funds can invest.

SMSF funded travel expenses so a member, family and friends can travel to an ORP to stay can stand out to the ATO as the use of the ORP as lifestyle asset diverging from permissible purposes.

As the regulator of SMSFs, the ATO can:

  • apply to an Australian superior court to impose civil penalties on the trustee/s or its director/s of the SMSF (SMSFTsDs): section 197 of the SIS Act 1993 for breach of  a civil penalty provision: section 193, further bearing in mind that an Australian superior court can impose criminal sanctions on SMSFTsDs where the court finds a breach of a civil penalty provision involve dishonesty for financial gain, deception or fraud: section 202 of the SIS Act 1993; and/or
  • determine that a SMSF is a non-complying fund due to contravention of a civil penalty provision: paragraph 39(1)(b) and section 42 of the SIS Act 1993.

Should the ATO go to court then fines for breach of a civil penalty provision can easily be around $20,000 per breach and other orders, such as education orders, can be made, and the trustees/ directors can be disqualified from acting as SMSFTsDs.

Meeting travel expense in a SMSF – rethink

So, given all this can occur, hard questions should be asked before a SMSF meets travel costs of member or related party of a SMSF to visit an ORP.

  • Could the visit to the ORP for inspection, maintenance or investment evaluation have been done by a locally based professional or tradesperson at arm’s length from the SMSF where no or negligible local travel costs would have been incurred?
  • What did the member do other than these activities on the overseas journey to the ORP?
  • What tariff did the member pay where the member or their related parties where accommodated at the ORP?
  • Why was an ORP, which is more challenging to inspect and maintain from a distance, chosen as a preferred investment in line with the investment strategy of the SMSF?

Non-compliance – loss of nearly half a SMSF’s assets in income tax

Where a SMSF is made non-complying by the ATO then item 2 of table in section 295-320 of the ITAA 1997 applies which broadly brings the assets in the SMSF as a non-CSF that was previously a CSF to income tax at, presently, a 45% rate. From then on, while the SMSF remains a non-CSF, that rate applies to income of the SMSF.

The range of outcomes that can happen where SMSFTsDs breach the SIS Act 1993, including the 45% tax on all assets, is considered in this video from the ATO: SMSF – What happens if your fund breaches the law? – ATOtv https://is.gd/YQSRJE .

Disproportionate consequences

So there is risk of significant and disproportionate consequences where travel costs are subject to ATO review or audit. It is up to the trustee of the SMSF as to how this risk is best dealt with.

It follows that if there is payment for or reimbursement to the directors it should be scrupulous – backed by strong reason as to the imperative for a member to attend an ORP in person with costs carefully apportioned where there is any private component with no tax deduction claimable by the SMSF unless section 26-31 of the ITAA 1997 can somehow be addressed.

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Woes of a beneficiary of a discretionary trust in getting a tax deduction for interest: Chadbourne v. C of T.

CarWoes

In the recent Administrative Appeals Tribunal case Chadbourne and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2020] AATA 2441 (10 July 2020) the AAT confirmed the disallowance of tax deductions to Mr. D. Chadbourne (the Applicant).

The Applicant was a beneficiary of the D & M Chadbourne Family Trust (DMCFT) and the Applicant was denied deductions for:

  • interest on money borrowed by the Applicant to fund the acquisition of real estate and shares by the DMCFT; and
  • other expenses incurred by the Applicant expended;

so the DMCFT could earn income.

The discretionary trust

The DMCFT was a discretionary trust. In Chadbourne Deputy President Britten-Jones usefully described a discretionary trust:

I note that the meaning of the term ‘discretionary trust’ is disclosed by a consideration of usage rather than doctrine, and the usage is descriptive rather than normative. It is used to identify a species of express trust, one where the entitlement of beneficiaries to income, or to corpus, or both, is not immediately ascertainable; rather, the beneficiaries are selected from a nominated class by the trustee or some other person and this power (which may be a special or hybrid power) may be exercisable once or from time to time.

Chadbourne at paragraph 8

The mere expectancy of a beneficiary of a discretionary trust

Because the beneficiaries of a discretionary trust are not immediately ascertainable and are to be selected, a prospective beneficiary only has an expectancy of earning trust income unless and until the beneficiary is so selected by the trustee to take income:

Unless and until the Trustee of the discretionary trust exercises the discretion to distribute a share of the income of the trust estate to the applicant, the applicant’s interest in the income of the discretionary trust is a mere expectancy. It is neither vested in interest nor vested in possession, and the applicant has no right to demand and receive payment of it.

Chadbourne at paragraph 57

or in the case of a beneficiary who takes in default of exercise of discretion they have no more than a similar expectancy.

The Applicant was a beneficiary of the DMCFT with an expectancy interest.

The available tax deduction

The Applicant could not satisfy the first limb of the general deduction provision, now in the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1997, which allows an income tax deduction for a loss or outgoing to the extent:

it is incurred in gaining or producing your assessable income 

paragraph 8-1(1)(a) of the ITAA 1997 (emphasis added)

In Chadbourne the Applicant’s expenditure was incurred to gain or produce income for the trustee of the DMCFT, a separate legal entity. Applying authority including Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153, Antonopoulos and FCT [2011] AATA 431; 84 ATR 311, Case M36 (1980) 80 ATC 280,  Commissioner of Taxation v Roberts and Smith (1992) 37 FCR 246, where Hill J. referred to Ure v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 50 FLR 219, Fletcher v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 1 and other cases, the AAT required a nexus between loss or outgoings of the Applicant and the assessable income of the Applicant; not the DMCFT. Although the Applicant stood to earn income indirectly as the likely beneficiary of the DMCFT the AAT found:

The Trust is a discretionary trust the terms of which require the Trustee to exercise a discretion as to whom a distribution of net income is to be made.  It is an inherent requirement of the exercise of that discretion that it be given real and genuine consideration. There must be ‘the exercise of an active discretion’. There were numerous beneficiaries in the Trust.  There was no certainty provided by the terms of the Trust that the Trustee would exercise its discretionary power of appointment in favour of the applicant.

Chadbourne at paragraph 53

and the Applicant thus had not incurred the expenditure in gaining or producing the assessable income of the Applicant.

Why did the Applicant run the AAT appeal?

The Applicant in Chadbourne was self-represented. With the benefit of professional advice or assistance the Applicant may have:

  • more readily foreseen the outcome of his appeal to the AAT which, in the light of the authority applied by Deputy President Britten-Jones, could be seen as inevitable; or
  • moreover, arranged the loan to achieve the required section 8-1 nexus between the outgoings and the assessable income of a taxpayer.

Safer alternative 1 – trustee loan

The most obvious alternative would have been for the trustee of the trust to have been the borrower and to have directly incurred the relevant expenses though those actions would have been different commercial arrangements to those that were done.

These actions may have been more complicated and expensive to arrange: not the least because the financier may have required the Applicant to personally guarantee repayment of the loan by the trustee of the trust which was a corporate trustee with limited liability. Nonetheless these precautions would have ensured section 8-1 deductions were available to the trustee of the trust.

(Somewhat) safer alternative 2 – on-loan to the trustee

The other and perhaps commercially easier alternative would have been an on-loan of the borrowed funds by the Applicant to the trust.

The Applicant in Chadbourne may have belatedly considered an on-loan solution. At paragraph 11 of the AAT decision it was observed that the Applicant had abandoned a contention that there was a “written funding agreement” between the Applicant and the trustee of the DMCFT which the Commissioner had suggested was an invention to assist the Applicant in the appeal.

In the event of a genuine on-loan the trustee of the trust would hold the borrowed funds as loan funds with a clarity as to whom interest and principal is to be repaid rather than as a capital contribution or gift to the trust without that clarity.

On-loan – interest free

Clearly the on-loan by the Applicant to the trustee of the trust should not be interest free as the Applicant then faces the Chadbourne problem of having no assessable income with which to justify a section 8-1 deduction. In the words of Taxation Determination TD 2018/9 Income tax: deductibility of interest expenses incurred by a beneficiary of a discretionary trust on borrowings on-lent interest-free to the trustee:

A beneficiary of a discretionary trust who borrows money, and on-lends all or part of that money to the trustee of the discretionary trust interest-free, is usually not entitled to a deduction for any interest expenditure incurred by the beneficiary in relation to the borrowed money on-lent to the trustee under section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997)…  

TD 2018/9 – paragraph 1

On-loan – at low interest

An on-loan at low interest was arranged in Ure v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 11 ATR 484. In Ure the borrower borrowed funds at up to 12.5% p.a. interest and on-lent the funds to his wife and his discretionary trust at 1% p.a. The Full Federal Court found that the deduction Mr. Ure could claim under the first limb of the general deduction provision, sub-section 51(1) of the ITAA 1936, was limited to the 1% p.a. by which the interest income earned by Mr. Ure from his on-loan was confined.

On loan – at equivalent interest

It thus follows from TD 2018/9, Ure and Chadbourne that, to achieve deductibility in full for interest on funds borrowed and on-lent to a related discretionary trust, the interest earned by the beneficiary/on-lender on the on-loan should be the interest payable by the on-lender on the loan from the financier. This should leave the beneficiary/borrower in a tax neutral position on his or her loan on-loaned with assessable interest earned under the on-loan equalling deductible interest paid on the loan.

Related loan issues

As the on-loan is a related loan there are further considerations which will attract the scrutiny of the Commissioner:

A related on-loan should ideally be carefully documented and it should be clarified that the beneficiary/on-lender has an indefeasible right to the interest even though the on-lender is a related party of the borrower. It is also important that commitments in the on-loan agreement are met and generally interest due to the beneficiary/on-lender shouldn’t be capitalised and, especially, shouldn’t be aggregated with unpaid present entitlements due to the beneficiary.

The Commissioner could take these positions:

  • that the on-loan with interest is inadequately documented and can’t be proved so accounting entries capitalising interest shouldn’t be considered conclusive; or
  • the on-loan may be documented but it is a sham and the failure of the trust to pay interest when due shows this.

See my blog post at this site “Only a loan? Impugnable loans, proving them for tax and shams” https://wp.me/p6T4vg-8a which shows the fallibility of related party loans when these questions are contested with the Commissioner.

Woes with hybrid trusts

A hybrid trust, also a descriptive rather than a normative structure, can also fit the Deputy President Britten-Jones formulation of a discretionary trust where the entitlement of beneficiaries of the hybrid trust to income is not immediately ascertainable and is subject to the exercise of a discretion. It has been recognised,  including in the Commissioner’s Taxpayer Alert TA 2008/3 Uncommercial use of certain trusts that the considerations of the AAT in Chadbourne can similarly apply to deny a section 8-1 deduction to the holder of an interest in a hybrid trust who incurs expenditure to earn income through a hybrid trust structure.

In passing I note my wariness of hybrid trusts which are typically aggressive and sometimes tax abusive arrangements. The Commissioner’s Tax Alerts are particularly directed against tax aggressive activity.

That said, the trust in the case of Forrest v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 6, which was referred to in a citation (sic.) in Chadbourne, appears to have been an instance of a hybrid trust where entitlement of unit holders to ordinary income was ascertainable and not subject to a discretion. On appeal to the Full Federal Court, the unit holders in Forrest could establish a nexus between borrowing expenditure incurred and assessable income.

$3,000 deduction cap for managing personal tax affairs – non-millionaires caught in the cross-fire?

Labor’s Fairer Tax System plan

The ALP’s Andrew Leigh and Chris Bowen announced their A Fairer Tax System for Millions, Not Millionaires plan on 13 May 2017. The plan is comprised of a number of laudable and progressive policy announcements including transparency improvements that will impede tax avoidance by wealthy taxpayers and multinationals.

These policies are:

  1. $3,000 cap on deductions for managing their tax affairs for individuals.
  2. Public reporting of country-by-country reports.
  3. Whistleblower protection and rewards.
  4. Mandatory shareholder reporting of tax haven exposure.
  5. Public reporting of Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) data.
  6. Government tenderers must disclose their country of tax domicile.
  7. Develop guidelines for tax haven investment by superannuation funds.
  8. Publicly accessible registry of the beneficial ownership of Australian listed companies.
  9. Australian Taxation Office disclosure of settlements and reporting of aggressive tax minimisation.

The first measure, which this blog post concerns, is a proposed cap of $3,000 on the income tax deduction for managing personal tax affairs. There is no doubt this cap will restrict tax deductibility, which is substantially the funding by other taxpayers, of wealthy taxpayers’ tax professional costs of devising ways to avoid paying Australian tax.

Why an arbitrary $3,000 cap?

Still the $3,000 cap is arbitrary and there is, somehow, a disconnect in the announcement between the proposed cap and the millionaires against whom it is targeted. Why is the cap $3,000 rather than $30,000? My point is that it is not so unusual for ordinary taxpayers, particularly property owners who are not millionaires at whom the Fairer Tax System proposals are directed, to rack up tax professional costs of more than $3,000 for managing their tax affairs in an income year. The $3,000 cap includes tax agent costs for annual tax return preparation and lodgment so the remaining cap to deal with remaining tax difficulties or obligations will be something less than $3,000. So, although the measure will achieve its aim to curb deductibility of these costs to millionaires, there will be taxpayers who are not millionaires who will be collaterally caught with non-deductible tax professional costs in excess of the cap.

It is not so clear that the cap has been designed by someone who has real experience of seriously high individual tax professional costs and of situations where they may happen. Sure, all being well, a salary earner who owns real estate and who engages a tax agent, who charges moderately, will have tax professional costs in an income year comfortably under the cap. However, the salary earner with tax difficulties out of the ordinary may find himself or herself with a need to take a considered custom professional tax advice or to have his or her tax advisor non-prejudicially apply for a binding private ruling to protect himself or herself under the self assessment system.

The self assessment system

Out of the ordinary doesn’t mean tax avoidance is going on. Under the self assessment system a taxpayer is responsible for correct reporting and filing of tax information and severe penalties and interest apply if the taxpayer makes an error and a tax shortfall is assessed. If the taxpayer has an activity or activities where the tax treatment is unclear then it is the taxpayer who must ensure his or her return or other statements to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) complies with tax law adopting, in the least, a reasonably arguable position on items in the return or statements that are contentious.

Something over $2,000 is not a big budget for obtaining a tax advice letter or a position paper or for professional preparation of an application for a private binding ruling or a complex objection. Often issues an individual can face can take a tax professional a couple of days or more to do thoroughly.

It can be costly just to understand obligations imposed by government

Not so long ago I was briefed to give tax advice to an owner of a heritage building about to enter into a sale of “transferable floor space” in compliance with local government heritage laws. The interaction of the relevant capital gains tax (CGT) and goods and service tax (GST) laws with property, environment and local government laws, cases and public rulings took considerable time to work through even in the absence of any live dispute about these matters with the ATO. $2,000 would have been a fraction of fees for the time needed to give advice so that the client understood the client’s CGT and GST obligations on the sale . The correct application of CGT events and tax rules that apply in this client’s situation are notably unclear and difficult and, in its rulings, the ATO takes positions which some may view as confused and ambiguous. A withering array of laws applied to this heritage building owner.

Each of these laws, considered separately, benefit or aim to benefit government, society and thus other taxpayers by the contribution of taxes, the stimulation of commerce and the preservation of heritage buildings. But is it fair for society to impose such a multitude of obligations on a not necessarily wealthy building owner yet severely reduce society’s contribution to the owner’s costs of compliance with them?

You see much of my work, and the work of many other tax advisors who act for clients who are not necessarily wealthy, is just to advise or explain how the tax law applies to them and what their position is. Generally, as the tax laws have been tweaked and greatly expanded over time, the tax laws do not present exploitative opportunities to ordinary taxpayers for avoidance. There are, of course, exceptions.

The CGT provisions are a good example of tax laws that are necessarily intricate and complex. $2,000 in professional advice costs just to understand a CGT position in an advice from a CGT expert won’t go far. The CGT rules can apply, and severely, to taxpayers who own property, securities and other valuables. If the owner dies or is a non-resident the complexity can ratchet up. Not all of the aforementioned are millionaires.

It can be costly to get a ruling or guidance from the Australian Taxation Office

It is frequently the case that an ordinary taxpayer is unable to articulate, or would be disadvantaged having to personally articulate, a technical capital gains tax problem to the ATO without professional assistance in order to obtain guidance or a binding private ruling from the ATO. So an ordinary taxpayer can be justified in seeking substantial tax professional help applying for a private binding ruling from the ATO. If a binding private ruling adverse to the taxpayer is issued by the ATO the taxpayer may seek to dispute the ruling and still further tax professional help is needed. The taxpayer’s professional tax advisor may need to attend the ATO or prepare an objection or appeal.

The intractability of many tax problems, notably capital gains tax problems, is usually not the fault of the taxpayer but is a feature of complex tax law seeking to impose tax obligations in a wide diversity of situations fairly on the tax paying community.

Costly tax problems not of concern to wealthy taxpayers

A taxpayer of modest means suffers an injury at work and receives an ongoing insurance payout. This taxpayer is the opposite of a millionaire. Still the taxation of the insurance payout gives rise to the income versus capital conundrum on which the Australian income tax system continues to rely. The payouts fall through the cracks of types of insurance payout that are afforded tax exempt status under the Income Assessment Acts 1936 and 1997. If the payouts are capital then capital gains on personal injury payouts are exempt from CGT so there is a lot of tax at stake if the payouts should be treated as capital rather than as assessable income.

Pursuing capital treatment of the payouts is not tax avoidance by the wealthy. Inevitably ruling, objection and appeal costs of disputing that the payouts are not assessable income are likely to be way in excess of $3,000.

These kinds of cases appear often enough in published Administrative Appeals Tribunal reports, and there are plenty below the visible tip of that iceberg to show that they still remain a frequent and expensive kind of tax dispute for injury victims. To deprive injury victims of tax deductibility for costs of their tax dispute to target other less deserving taxpayers is tough indeed on taxpayers affected. It is of no consolation to an ordinary taxpayer who can’t claim most of their seriously high tax professional costs that he or she is one of a number of less than 90,000 taxpayers who incur more than $3,000 in tax professional costs each income year.

Australia’s tax system abounds in these kinds of structural challenges. Whether or not an activity of a taxpayer amounts to “an adventure in the nature of trade” and consequently an enterprise carried on by a taxpayer attracting a GST obligation, is another good example of a tax uncertainty a taxpayer who is not a millionaire may find costly to solve in their case and may not solve without taking valuable professional assistance.

The cap binary and alternatives to better target the cap

So if $3,000 might not be enough of a cap to ensure fair operation of the cap, why impose a binary limitation with such a confidence in the announcement that its impact will be on millionaires?

The small business capital gains tax measures themselves show that the demarcation between “small” and bigger business is not necessarily easily achieved as shown by the unwieldy $6 million net asset test. A demarcation between ordinary and “millionaire” taxpayers to qualify for exemption under the cap may be similarly difficult. But might it be possible to devise a targeted cap which looks at the character of the professional tax costs of a taxpayer of managing their personal tax affairs so that the cap operates more equitably?

For instance could costs of professional tax work just directed at establishing the position of a taxpayer under certain tax laws on non-contrived circumstances be exempted from the cap? Most capital gains tax rules could be within that exemption. If the professional work addressed specific anti-avoidance measures, the general anti-avoidance provisions or exploitative tax planning the professional work could be “tainted” by that consideration and so fall outside of the exemption. One difficulty is that some sort of “chinese wall” solution may be needed so privileged thus confidential tax advice could be considered to verify whether the costs of the professional tax law assistance is exempt from a targeted cap on costs of managing tax affairs.

It may be possible to conveniently go through all of the (many) tax laws and classify those where issues and disputes arising from them are benign, in an avoidance context, as exempt from the cap. Often wealthy taxpayers and their advisers have little interaction with these laws and so exempting them would not give wealthy taxpayers any advantage. That would better achieve the aim of the Fairer Tax System plan.

Are there limits to interest deductions in Australia in participative loan arrangements involving entities in the same economic group?

Question on taxlinked.net members forum about Participative Loan Taxation

Since 1st January 2015 in Spain, interests are (interest is) not tax deductible when the participative loan is agreed to between entities of the same economic group. Is there similar treatment in your countries?

Response to post

Generally not in Australia.

In Australia interest is deductible if incurred on debt finance obtained to earn assessable income or to carry on a business even if debt finance arrangements include entities not dealing with each other at arms length.

These deductibility tests are serious purposive tests so non-arms length transactions attract particular scrutiny and, like in most jurisdictions, the burden of making out either purpose is on the taxpayer. As well as the general construct of sham there are a numerous specific instances where the Australian law denies interest deductions including:

  • sometimes where deductions are prepaid;
  • where there is not a sufficient relation between the loan and income received after a “commonsense” or “practical” weighing of the circumstances; and
  • where deductions are artificial or contrived or have those elements– if specific anti-avoidance rules do not apply.

Australia has a longstanding general anti-avoidance provision that can apply even if the interest deduction was otherwise available under the law. In international outbound financing the deduction can be lost because foreign income can be treated as other than assessable income. International debt/hybrid mismatch rules are being developed in Australia following some taxpayer success resisting anti-avoidance rules and the international experience.

Deductions are also lost if a “loan” is technically found to have characteristics of equity in substance.

Australian courts look at the role of associated entities to understand their purpose and look at transactions holistically. In other words they will focus on the economic units, rather than on juristic entities which seems to happening in Spain from what you say. Hence an interest deduction to an entity can be reduced, for instance, if the debt finance is on-lent to a related entity to earn income palpably less than the deduction.

Australia also has thin capitalisation rules which apply to limit otherwise allowable large cross border interest deductions.

Chevron Australia is involved in the first major transfer pricing case under the new BEPS regime where the Commissioner of Taxation is fighting to contend that interest paid and deducted exceeded the arms length amount based on BEPS arms length principles. The Commissioner won the first stage of the case in 2015.

Getting a deduction for tax objection and income tax advice costs

A tax deduction is available for costs of preparing and lodging an income tax objection under section 25-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997). Section 25-5 provides a deduction for taxpayers for the costs of managing their tax affairs.

Further, fees for taking income tax advice, including obtaining a position statement, are deductible where the advice is provided by a “recognised tax adviser”: paragraph 25-5(2)(e). A recognised tax adviser is either a registered tax agent or a legal practitioner.

Legal professional privilege

A further advantage of taking income tax advice from a legal practitioner is that written advice attracts client legal privilege. Unless the taxpayer waives the privilege, the privilege protects the advice from compulsory disclosure to the Commissioner of Taxation or to a tribunal or court.

Deduction for costs relating to tax affairs of a capital nature not excluded

If the expenditure is not of a capital nature then it may also be allowable as a deduction under sub-section 8(1) of the ITAA 1997. If the expenditure relates to tax affairs of a capital nature then that has no impact on the deduction available under section 25-5: sub-section 25-5(4).